DRDO and PSU's

fire starter said:
Zero orders for mpatgm, helina, dhruvastra & sant, meanwhile dalali started for foreign garbage.

View: https://x.com/Samarth19567493/status/1897629653809946782?t=_tjp44MCUjTsC6oJHzLcjg&s=19

OROP genrols are bloody parasites. They should be kicked out of procurement process along with babus, a professional body should be made for acquisition purpose.

View: https://x.com/Firezstarter1/status/1897645535999275452?t=YJ7oUwgj0qES17zanSXOAw&s=19
Click to expand...



it is bloody dalal article
 
fire starter said:
Zero orders for mpatgm, helina, dhruvastra & sant, meanwhile dalali started for foreign garbage.

View: https://x.com/Samarth19567493/status/1897629653809946782?t=_tjp44MCUjTsC6oJHzLcjg&s=19

OROP genrols are bloody parasites. They should be kicked out of procurement process along with babus, a professional body should be made for acquisition purpose.

View: https://x.com/Firezstarter1/status/1897645535999275452?t=YJ7oUwgj0qES17zanSXOAw&s=19
Click to expand...

It feel like hitting my head on stone
You are in dire need of atgm 80% atgms are needed to full fill required inventory. There is huge shortfall now u have mpatgm, bdl has amogha 2 & amogha 3 atgm still you're not inducting them.

13000 crore were unspend from last defence budget and here you are at this point this is not abt buying phoren stuff but rather not letting indigeneous system compete there masters.
Unless and until you induct them they won't get export orders. At this point they're just delaying the Indigeneous systems inductions on purpose for not letting it succeed and follow the legacy of atags,whap(in exports)

Otherwise who would suffer 80% shortfall despite having world class atgms at home like mpatgm who beat spike & javelin in India's harsh environments. While this missile failed in adverse Himalayas & hot deserts mpatgms succeeded in all of this tests.
It's just shameful and I wanna hit my head on the stone.
 
Why did Modi stop short of splitting DRDO last year. It would have been good to the innovation and development. In current state it is politicalized and unwieldy organization with no responsibility or accountability. All it does is press releases of greatness.

The organization has to be freed from babu type constraints. Still better break it up and privatize the components.
 
Satish Sharma Ji said:
It feel like hitting my head on stone
You are in dire need of atgm 80% atgms are needed to full fill required inventory. There is huge shortfall now u have mpatgm, bdl has amogha 2 & amogha 3 atgm still you're not inducting them.

13000 crore were unspend from last defence budget and here you are at this point this is not abt buying phoren stuff but rather not letting indigeneous system compete there masters.
Unless and until you induct them they won't get export orders. At this point they're just delaying the Indigeneous systems inductions on purpose for not letting it succeed and follow the legacy of atags,whap(in exports)

Otherwise who would suffer 80% shortfall despite having world class atgms at home like mpatgm who beat spike & javelin in India's harsh environments. While this missile failed in adverse Himalayas & hot deserts mpatgms succeeded in all of this tests.
It's just shameful and I wanna hit my head on the stone.
Click to expand...
If anything that's on offer table then it's indigenous substitute will definitely be ditched no matter how good the platform is
All rules system and regulations will change in order to incorporate imported system no matter it has failed tests it will be given opportunities until it passes and on contrary if once indigenous equipment fails armed forces won't hesitate to cancel it
Kya karen our manufacturers can't get their children settled in abroad or a seat in ivy league uni
 
Hari Sud said:
Why did Modi stop short of splitting DRDO last year. It would have been good to the innovation and development. In current state it is politicalized and unwieldy organization with no responsibility or accountability. All it does is press releases of greatness.

The organization has to be freed from babu type constraints. Still better break it up and privatize the components.
Click to expand...
Are you for real??? The only organization that ensured that India remains soveirgn in a environment where people left right and centre of political spectrum be it politicians, media, judges, bureaucrats, forces and even from DRDO itself were compromised. DRDO as an institute made sure no matter how many of how powerful people change side the right to decide on soveirgn matters remains with India itself.

If we privatice DRDO, then we are screwed... Take a look at what sort of burden DRDO carries while remaining silent.
IF anything the Comittee recommended that we increase the budget of DRDO, privatization was never a thing..

here read from page 15..

Adobe Acrobat

acrobat.adobe.com acrobat.adobe.com
 
Last edited:
Asmodeus said:
Are you for real??? The only organization that ensured that India remains soveirgn in a environment where people left right and centre of political spectrum be it politicians, media, judges, bureaucrats, forces and even from DRDO itself were compromised. DRDO as an institute made sure no matter how many of how powerful people change side the right to decide on soveirgn matters remains with India itself.

If we privatice DRDO, then we are screwed... Take a look at what sort of burden DRDO carries while remaining silent.
IF anything the Comittee recommended that we increase the budget of DRDO, privatization was never a thing..

here read from page 15..

Adobe Acrobat

acrobat.adobe.com acrobat.adobe.com
Click to expand...
Privatisation would be deadly for drdo as innovation will only happen in instant money making areas. Terrible for long term
However freeing this organisation from babus would be great. Babus needs to be replaced by technocrats from triservices,mod,drdo etc etc
We need to do something to create enough technocrats to lead this organisation.
Babus don't understand complexity of R&D if any project fails instantly heavily politicises cag comes in publishes reports financial loss this stalls r&d as people are not willing own and take new innovative ideas out of board. This will never let us become a trend setter.
Boeings downfall began aftererger with macdonalds douglas as the leadership of macdonald got onto the top of whole corporation earlier former engineer's were at the top of organisations.
Babu's are parasites.

Something revolutionary needs to be done this usual conduct exam on basis of who does better ratta gets more marks becomes babu needs to be stopped. Instead people who have industrial experience knowledge inshort technocrats are needed for many gov organisation out there.
 
Last edited:
fire starter said:
Zero orders for mpatgm, helina, dhruvastra & sant, meanwhile dalali started for foreign garbage.

View: https://x.com/Samarth19567493/status/1897629653809946782?t=_tjp44MCUjTsC6oJHzLcjg&s=19

OROP genrols are bloody parasites. They should be kicked out of procurement process along with babus, a professional body should be made for acquisition purpose.

View: https://x.com/Firezstarter1/status/1897645535999275452?t=YJ7oUwgj0qES17zanSXOAw&s=19
Click to expand...


View: https://x.com/KesariDhwaj/status/1897712904981590065
 
Green light for imports in my view best choice would be (if import is an option for increasing sq)su57 with super sukhoi upgrade as russian avionics & sensors no good enough.
Infact they had very recently offered such deal as they are very desperate to sell.
What concerns me is mk2 & AMCA order no. might get affected as this imports will consume alot of capital expenditure.

View: https://youtu.be/fKcURtbcV6M?feature=shared
 
Genrols infighting can screw up your war effort. This is from Reddit.

The Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) and Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) had a legendarily poor inter-service relationship, with a very strong rivalry between the two branches of the Imperial military. This rivalry in turn indeed impacted Japan's ability to properly project power, as often decisions of policy or operations was based as much on the political needs of cooperating between the two branches of the Imperial military as it was Japan's actual interests or the needs of combat operations.

At this point it's helpful to discuss at least some of the reasons why the inter-service rivalry between the two branches was so extreme. For a variety of reasons, when the IJA was established, the General Staff reported directly to the Emperor and bypassed the civilian cabinet completely. Later, when the IJN received its own independent General Staff, this body also reported directly to the Emperor. The Emperor, for his part, was the Supreme Commander of both the Army and the Navy, but custom and tradition commanded that he remain mostly detached and not take an overly active role in managing the government. Importantly, there was no unified body responsible for coordination between the IJA and IJN short of an Imperial Conference between the two branches with the Emperor in attendance. This meant that while there were draft Imperial Defence Policies created and circulated, they were ultimately little more than two entirely separate operational plans from both the Army and the Navy with little thought given to crafting a true unified strategy for Japan. There was no effort made to craft a unified view that would apply all of Japan's resources to a particular strategic vision. Rather, the Army and Navy each pursued their own version of the same.

The Army, for its part, saw Japan's main interests as on continental Asia, and thus the main threat to Japan's security as first a potentially revanchist Russian Empire and later the Soviet Union. The Navy on the other hand, sought to increase its own relevance in order to create further justifications for its expansion, and so made its main rival the United States. Importantly, when the Navy initially decided that it would begin building against the US, there was little in the way of direct conflict between the US and Japan. Rather, the United States Navy served as a simple budgetary enemy for the IJN, enabling the IJN to demand a fleet capable of challenging the US Navy. When combined with Japan's relatively limited resources--not only shares of the national budget, but also resource allocations like steel--these completely separate targets resulted in both the IJA and IJN squabbling against each other for resource allocations. While some of these demands could be relieved by squeezing resources out of the civilian sector, ultimately, an increased focus on one service meant a reduction of resources for the other. The two branches simply refused to work together, resulting in a duplication of efforts on a variety of fronts. One example helps to illustrate this, pulled from Mark Peattie's *Sunburst: The Rise of Japanese Naval Air Power, 1909-1941* :

An example of the obdurate nature of such interservice suspicion and hostility was provided by Germany’s wartime naval attaché to Tokyo, Capt. Paul Wennacker. After the war Wennacker recalled that during a tour of the Nakajima aircraft plant he was first guided by several naval officers around the navy’s development and manufacturing division of the plant. At the conclusion of the tour, the navy men opened a door that had been kept tightly closed. Here the naval officers bade him good-bye, and on the other side of the door a group of army officers took him on a tour of their section of the plant, an area to which the navy officers had no access.
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To say that interservice relations were "poor" is a bit of an understatement.

This divide was astoundingly apparent in the immediately lead up to the Pacific War. The IJA had found itself heavily tied down by the apparently endless war in China, and its eyes had turned southward to the European colonies in South East Asia (the Navy's traditional area of interest). The Army hoped that operations there would not only seize resources vital for Japan's economy and war machine, but also help isolate China from the West, which the Army hoped would enable them to finally win the war. Operations in the South would require cooperation with the Navy, which was all too happy to play a dangerous game, using the Army's need for their aid to demand increased resource allocations to prepare for war against the United States and the European colonial powers, while also attempting to avoid provocations against the same, as the IJN doubted its ability to defeat the European and American fleets. These internal political squabbles between the IJN and IJA ultimately led to the decision to occupy all of French Indochina as a "compromise" between the two, which set the final chain of events in motion that would culminate at Pearl Harbor.

During the war itself, cooperation between the IJA and IJN remained fraught at best. While the initial offensive operations had gone well, once these were completed, the lack of strategy meant that the IJA and IJN were effectively at odds with what they were to do now that they had achieved much of what they had set out to. The IJA was more defensively minded and wanted to fortify Japan's early conquests and was very hesitant about future aggressive operations. The IJN on the other hand, sought to keep expanding Japan's defensive perimeter by launching operations to defeat the remnants of the US Pacific Fleet and also further isolate Australia. This lack of strategic vision caused by the limited cooperation between the two branches resulted in Japanese operations in the spring of 1942 to be far more haphazard, with forces spread out engaged in limited operations to satisfy the demands of the Army in order to support Navy operations and vice-versa. This dispersal was one factor (among many others) in what led to the Japanese disaster at the Battle of Midway.
Click to expand...

View: https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/n2wp5o/how_bad_was_the_interservice_rivalry_in_the/
 
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