Indian Special Forces

Understanding Para SF's CQB practices

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They are doing everything by the book, everything their manuals says is correct. But here's the problem - the rear element has no clean angle to return fire if a millitant were to pop with a machine gun or throws a grenade out the window. By the time they pulled back, the enemy had repositioned.

In the second pic, The last man is nearly touching the wall, meaning they have no room to maneuver if the team needs to break contact. Also, ideally, the breacher should be protected behind a cover man, or at least positioned at an angle to reduce fragmentation risk.

Yes we do see the rear guy keeping a low ready while watching the window, but - It assumes the enemy is static, unaware, and waiting.

Those who still cling to outdated techniques, those who refuse to adapt, are signing the death warrants of the men who will follow their orders.

Every time I see Para SF doing CQB, I see that the team is too clustered, creating a single point of failure.

If the enemy inside is prepared, they have ample time to set up crossfires, plant explosives, or bottleneck the entry point. This is exactly what happened during 2016 Pampore attack.

I am no expert but I'll tell you this, that it doesnt need a staff offcier to figure out that they need to stagger formation and space in
 
Jedi Operator said:
Understanding Para SF's CQB practices

View attachment 27139
View attachment 27140

They are doing everything by the book, everything their manuals says is correct. But here's the problem - the rear element has no clean angle to return fire if a millitant were to pop with a machine gun or throws a grenade out the window. By the time they pulled back, the enemy had repositioned.

In the second pic, The last man is nearly touching the wall, meaning they have no room to maneuver if the team needs to break contact. Also, ideally, the breacher should be protected behind a cover man, or at least positioned at an angle to reduce fragmentation risk.

Yes we do see the rear guy keeping a low ready while watching the window, but - It assumes the enemy is static, unaware, and waiting.

Those who still cling to outdated techniques, those who refuse to adapt, are signing the death warrants of the men who will follow their orders.

Every time I see Para SF doing CQB, I see that the team is too clustered, creating a single point of failure.

If the enemy inside is prepared, they have ample time to set up crossfires, plant explosives, or bottleneck the entry point. This is exactly what happened during 2016 Pampore attack.

I am no expert but I'll tell you this, that it doesnt need a staff offcier to figure out that they need to stagger formation and space in
Click to expand...
Can you breakdown how exactly the casualties occured in Pampore?
 
Jedi Operator said:
Understanding Para SF's CQB practices

View attachment 27139
View attachment 27140

They are doing everything by the book, everything their manuals says is correct. But here's the problem - the rear element has no clean angle to return fire if a millitant were to pop with a machine gun or throws a grenade out the window. By the time they pulled back, the enemy had repositioned.

In the second pic, The last man is nearly touching the wall, meaning they have no room to maneuver if the team needs to break contact. Also, ideally, the breacher should be protected behind a cover man, or at least positioned at an angle to reduce fragmentation risk.

Yes we do see the rear guy keeping a low ready while watching the window, but - It assumes the enemy is static, unaware, and waiting.

Those who still cling to outdated techniques, those who refuse to adapt, are signing the death warrants of the men who will follow their orders.

Every time I see Para SF doing CQB, I see that the team is too clustered, creating a single point of failure.

If the enemy inside is prepared, they have ample time to set up crossfires, plant explosives, or bottleneck the entry point. This is exactly what happened during 2016 Pampore attack.

I am no expert but I'll tell you this, that it doesnt need a staff offcier to figure out that they need to stagger formation and space in
Click to expand...
Har rog ki eak dawa hi kyun na ajajmai

1741527478416.webp

Sar jo tera chakaraaye

Yaa dil duba jaaye

Aaja pyare paas hamaare

Kaahe ghabaraay kaahe ghabaraay
 
Jedi Operator said:
sure...I'll go in detail tomm
Click to expand...
I went back to two chapters for my research here, I knew it would take time and I was busy with some work so I called this off for today. But I wanted to do this, you guys can recheck and share anything you want to:

  1. Chapter 6 Capt. Pawan Kumar (India’s most fearless 2
  2. Part 2 Chapter 4 Capt. Tushar Mahajan (Balidaan)

I said in my previous post that ‘if the enemy inside is prepared, they have ample time to set up crossfires….or bottleneck the entry point’……Parampore mei yehi hua tha

The team stepped into the hallway without properly clearing it or confirming the room's interior status. Before entering a hallway or room, every corner should be cleared, and positions should be secured to avoid ambushes. CQB tactics typically involve “bounding” forward or waiting for backup and the rest of the team to enter before engaging – Capt. Pawan kicked in the door after a failed breach attempt and went inside blocking the fatal funnel where he engaged the terrorist in extreme close quarters. Now you gotta give him that, this requires BALLS!

But even in Comm Vijay Rawat’s various interviews I have seen him mention how first two men enter a room and confirm that it’s safe for others to do so, IMO that’s a crappy trick, because it limits your fire power and control of the room, what if the two inside get killed ? Well wait, in Praveen Teotia’s case, him and his buddy engaged the first targets and as soon as Teotia was down, the rest of the team instead of lobbing in a stun or something had to leave him and find a way to extract him or distract terrorists or find hostages. Again, the enemy was prepared to use our tactics against us.

Now back to the story, effective communication under fire is crucial. The team should have a robust protocol to handle situations where gunfire drowns out regular communication, including hand signals, pre-set codes for emergency situations, and short radio bursts to convey essential information.

Then the good thing the 10 Para team did was that they went in and secured the high ground first, they decided to fight top to bottom. However the teams stormed in with limited mention of securing critical areas such as stairwells or choke points before entering rooms. Terrorists positioned on higher floors had clear lines of sight, which indicates a lack of immediate control over building access points.

Captain Tushar advances despite heavy fire, leading to being pinned down and suffering significant injuries. The squad appears to lack proper cover and coordination during engagement. Everytime you see Indian SF doing room clearance, they are treating it as a cover and move firefight. Our guys possibly utilized "bounding" or "leapfrogging" to minimize exposure. That is commendable. There should have been more reliance on suppressive fire and tactical positioning, where each member covers specific angles while another moves. Charging alone or moving without support in such an environment increases vulnerability of a single individual.

With all due respect, after our guy threw grenades to clear a room, he advanced without securing the room first, which led to being pinned down again. Again I am not commenting against his courage but I understand that all of this happened because of lack of centralized training and proper equipment. An explosive breacher trained in dynamic entry could’ve saved Cap Pawan’s life, a proper and constant communication could’ve had Ln Nk Om Prakash alive today. The teams appear to enter the building through a primary route, clearing rooms sequentially. Lack of multiple entry (I can understand that is NSG’s forte) could’ve made this operation much feasible.

This operation is a testament to the indomitable spirit of those who serve in the line of duty but it does so highlight the lack of proper standardized training we have, Capt Mahajan was the ‘CQB’ expert of 9 Para and wrote a manual on it, why was this not shared with other battalions so that everyone has a common SOP, 9 is doing differently than 10. Why ?

And again, the courage displayed by Captian Pawan Kumar, Captain Tushar Mahajan, Lance Naik Om Prakash, and the entire team during the hostage rescue operation is nothing short of extraordinary. These individuals exemplified selflessness, resilience, and an unwavering commitment to their mission and the safety of the hostages.
 
Jedi Operator said:
And again, the courage displayed by Captian Pawan Kumar, Captain Tushar Mahajan, Lance Naik Om Prakash, and the entire team during the hostage rescue operation is nothing short of extraordinary. These individuals exemplified selflessness, resilience, and an unwavering commitment to their mission and the safety of the hostages.
Click to expand...

in the Early days of GWOT - it was found that the American's(Infantry and Marines) weapons handling was grossly inadequate for MOUT Urban Warfare/CQB - it was slow and not adaptive. SOF evolved to develop C-Clamping and adaptive Fireing techniques.

Those new SOPs has now spread officially across the US Military (all services)
 
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