I have no qualms about the capabilities our armed forces possess; they have proven time and again that when push comes to shove, they can outperform expectations, as seen in how decisively they've humiliated Pakistan in this 2025 conflict.
But my concern isn’t about our strength. It's about the strategic consequences of a regime change in Iran. Specifically, a U.S.-installed government in Tehran that might either be overtly supportive of Pakistan or, at the very least, aligned with broader American interests in the subcontinent.
Given historical precedent like in 1965, when Iran under the Shah allowed Pakistan to safeguard key military assets. I don't think it's far-fetched to imagine a repeat of said scenario. If Pakistan were to once again gain strategic depth through Iranian territory, especially to shield its critical assets or command structures, it would create a severe operational challenge for us. In operation sindoor we were able to use this exact lack of depth Pakistan got, for our successful attacks
In this case, we’d then again face a situation where any attempt to neutralize those assets could be interpreted as an act of war against Iran, in addition to Pakistan. That fundamentally complicates our escalation calculus and undermines our ability to decisively end a conflict on our terms.