In 2016, for instance, the
Indian Navy had acquired 177 sniper rifles, completing the entire import process in under 24 months. In stark contrast, the Indian Army had initiated its demand for similar rifles in 2009; but over years it had floated, scrapped and then re-issued several tenders for them without concluding the purchase till now.
Delayed weapons procurement process
Presently, the Indian Army’s critical sniper rifle procurement, intended to replace the Soviet-era Dragonov SVD model that first entered Army service in the mid-1980s, has been further postponed after the rifles were placed on the MoD’s proscribed list of 209 military platforms, equipment and related systems, which are to be progressively sourced indigenously.
But in the interim, in what has become routine practice of executing ‘intermediate’ equipment purchases, the Indian Army inducted 24 .338 Scorpio TGT sniper rifles from Victrix Armaments of Italy and M95 rifles from Baretta of the US in February 2019. This followed sustained sniping by the Pakistan Army across the Line of control (LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir, which continues and remains a persistent danger and threat.
File photo of Indian Army soldiers at the Line of Control. Photo: PTI
In enviable deviation from Army’s behaviour with regard to materiel acquisitions, the Indian Navy displayed quiet and dogged efficiency in technically evaluating, testing and eventually, in late 2016, acquiring 177 Sako TIKKA T3 TAC 7.62x51mm bolt action sniper rifles, selected over UK’s Steel Core Designs Thunderbolt SC-76 model, for its Marine Commando Special Forces (SF). The overall $2.98 million contract also included 100,000 rounds of 7.62x51mm match grade ammunition.
A Sako Tikka T3 rifle. Photo: Millermaster/Wikimedia Commons, Public Domain
The Indian Navy’s detailed timeline in summarily finalising this purchase too is revealing.
Its request for proposal (RFP), or tender, for these rifles was issued in early 2014, followed by user trials at a firing range in New Delhi’s outskirts in late 2015. Beretta was shortlisted around March that year and price negotiations launched thereafter, which concluded successfully a few weeks later.
“Once again, the Indian Navy’s sniper rifle buy was a conscious and pre-emptive procurement for rapidly emerging threats locally and overseas, following the force’s increased anti-piracy deployments in the Gulf of Aden and off India’s eastern and western seaboards,” said the MoD official, cited above. It had prudently anticipated the need for these essential weapon systems well in time and rapidly obtained them, he added.
The Indian Army’s bid, on the other hand, to acquire sniper rifles, needed more urgently on the LoC, is riddled with incompetence.
In 2009 it floated a tender for around 1,100 sniper rifles under the fast track procedure (FTP) which mandates a 12-month long deadline to conclude procurements. Incredulously, the RFP failed in mandating accuracy standards at a minimum 800m range and absurdly required the rifles to be fitted with a bayonet.
It was totally incomprehensible to the handful of vendors to determine why the rifle, purposed for employment at a distance of over 800m, needed a
bayonet that is normally used by infantry soldiers in close combat.
The unclear RFP also failed to differentiate between a bolt action or semi-automatic sniper rifle model – a critical QR (qualitative requirement) determinant for sniper rifles.
Expectedly, the RFP was cancelled after at least one round of trial firings in the respective vendors’ countries including Israel and a tender re-issued in September 2018 for 5,719 sniper rifles and 10.2 million rounds. This too was scrapped ten months later, in July 2019, after four leading overseas rival vendors failed to meet the Indian Army’s unrealistic qualitative requirements (QRs) and delivery schedules.
Unrealistic demands
This RFP required one of four shortlisted original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) of sniper rifles from amongst PT Pindad (Indonesia), Rosonboronexport (Russia), Barrett and MSA Global (USA), to transfer technology for the .339 Lapua Magnum ammunition to India’s state-owned Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) and indigenous private sector companies to locally manufacture an additional 4.6 million rounds.
Industry officials at the time said it was ‘commercially unviable by all and any standards’, for any manufacturer of such specialised ammunition to transfer technology for merely 4.6 million rounds. The proposed delivery schedule for the 5,719 rifles, which were being acquired under the ‘Buy and Make’ category of the MoD’s defence procurement procedure, 2016, too posed logistic problems. It required the shortlisted OEM to deliver the first lot of 707 rifles within six months of the contract being signed, and the remaining 4,472 supplied in batches of 1,200 units each over the next 30 months.
“No sniper rifle manufacturer produces such large numbers in the time stipulated in the RFP,” said a senior official from one of the OEM’s competing for the tender. The Indian Army fails to realise that such expert weaponry is not mass produced on an industrial scale, he added, declining to be named. Of the intended 5,719 rifles, 5,507 were for the Indian Army’s special forces and the remaining 212 for the Indian Air Force’s Garud Commando force.
Official sources told
The Wire that the ‘amplified’ sniper rifle ammunition QRs and impractical delivery targets were of a piece with numerous other Indian Army RFPs that had been routinely criticised by successive parliamentary defence committees, as impracticable. The April 2012 Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence, for example, revealed that as many as 41 of the Indian Army’s tenders for diverse equipment had been withdrawn or terminated due to ‘implausible’ QRs.
Former defence minister Manohar Parrikar too endorsed this proclivity on the Indian military’s part in 2016, when he stated that its QRs for equipment and platforms appeared to be straight out of “Marvel comic books”. Many of the technologies demanded and conditions stipulated for varied equipment were “
absurd and unrealistic,” the late defence minister had stated.
While the Indian Navy has prudently anticipated the need for essential weapon systems well in time and rapidly obtained them, the Army has been riddled with confusion over its procurement policy.
thewire.in