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How Trump Can End the War in Ukraine
Convince Kyiv to Trade Land for NATO Membership
Michael McFaul
December 12, 2024
A Ukrainian soldier firing a howitzer near Chasiv Yar, Ukraine, November 2024 Oleg Petrasiuk / Press Service of the 24th King Danylo Separate Mechanized Brigade of the Ukrainian Armed Forces / Reuters
Michael McFaul is Professor of Political Science, a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, and Director of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. He served as U.S. Ambassador to Russia from 2012 to 2014. He is the author of
From Cold War to Hot Peace: A U.S. Ambassador in Putin’s Russia.
At a CNN town hall in May 2023, Donald Trump promised that if elected, he would end the war in Ukraine in a single day. That bullish pledge has now become a familiar refrain, with the president-elect insisting that he uniquely has the nous to bring Russia and Ukraine to the table and force a truce. His imminent return to the White House has stirred a great deal of speculation on both sides of the Atlantic about the prospects for a peace deal. Since Russia launched its full-scale invasion in 2022, Kyiv and its backers have been wary of signaling an interest in negotiations, fearful that doing so would be seen as weakness. Trump’s reelection now gives Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky greater freedom to engage in talks: he can argue that he has no choice. In late November, in an interview with Sky News, he suggested that he was indeed ready to negotiate.
Conditions on the ground, however, are not conducive to a deal. Wars usually end in two ways: one side wins, or there is a stalemate. In
Ukraine, neither side seems near victory, but the war has not yet ground to a standstill. Russian President Vladimir Putin thinks he is winning. If Trump threatens to cut aid to Ukraine, Putin will be even more emboldened to keep fighting, not end his invasion; advancing armies rarely stop fighting when their opponent is about to become weaker. If Putin senses that Trump and his new team are trying to appease the Kremlin, he will become more aggressive, not less.
The lessons from U.S. negotiations with the Taliban during Trump’s first term should inform the president-elect’s thinking about dealing with
Putin. The Taliban and the Trump administration negotiated a deal that was highly favorable to the militant group but that the Biden administration nevertheless honored. Its terms included a cease-fire, a timeline for the departure of American forces, and the promise of a future political settlement between the Afghan government and the Taliban. The Taliban, however, did not commit to the agreement; instead, they used that peace plan as a way station on their path to total victory. Appeasement of the Taliban did not create peace. Appeasement of Putin won’t either. Instead of just giving Putin everything he wants—hardly an example of the president-elect’s much-vaunted prowess in dealmaking—Trump should devise a more sophisticated plan, encouraging Ukraine to nominally relinquish some territory to Russia in exchange for the security that would come with joining NATO. Only such a compromise will produce a permanent peace.
THE TRUMP CARD
In their rhetoric,
Trump and many of his allies have long expressed skepticism about U.S. support for Ukraine. They claim that backing Kyiv is a drain on American finances and has done little to end the war. But to abruptly cut funding for Ukraine now would not bring about peace; it would only spur further Russian aggression. To work toward a peace deal, Trump should first accelerate the delivery of military aid to Ukraine that has already been approved and then signal his intention to provide more weapons to stop Russia’s current offensive in the Donbas, the much-contested eastern region of Ukraine, and thereby create a stalemate on the battlefield. Putin will only negotiate seriously when Russian armed forces no longer have the capacity to seize more Ukrainian territory—or better yet, although less probable, when Russian soldiers begin losing ground. For serious negotiations to begin, Putin must first believe that the United States will not abandon Ukraine.
Continued:
After he convinces Putin to negotiate, Trump must also persuade
Zelensky to stop fighting. That will be a significant challenge, as doing so will require the Ukrainian president to give up the quest to liberate all Ukrainian territories occupied by Russian soldiers. In giving up land, Zelensky would also have to abandon his citizens in those occupied regions or find a way to guarantee that they would be allowed to emigrate to western Ukraine. No democratically elected leader makes such a concession lightly. A poll conducted this fall showed that 88 percent of Ukrainians still believe that Ukraine will win the war. Ukrainian soldiers, many of whom now fight to avenge their comrades killed in combat, will find it very difficult to lay down their weapons.
Putin must believe that the United States will not abandon Ukraine.
Zelensky and the Ukrainian people will not make such a sacrifice without receiving something of value in return:
NATO membership. Gaining immediate entry into NATO would help offset the bitter concession of allowing a giant chunk of their country to remain under Russian occupation. It is the one card Trump can play to convince Ukrainians to stop fighting.
Ukraine’s membership in NATO is also the only way to maintain permanent peace along the border between Russia and Ukraine, wherever it is finally drawn. Lesser security guarantees to Ukraine, such as the feckless 1994 Budapest Memorandum, in which Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States offered Ukraine security assurances in exchange for Kyiv’s handing over its nuclear arsenal to Moscow, or more recent proposals of support from individual countries are not credible. Ukrainians know that Putin has never attacked a NATO member but invaded Georgia in 2008, invaded Ukraine in 2014 and 2022, and keeps soldiers in Moldova. They have witnessed how Russia signed and then violated multiple international treaties and agreements prohibiting the use of force against Ukraine. Pieces of paper do nothing to constrain Russian aggression. Ukrainians rightly worry that a cease-fire in the absence of NATO membership will only give the Russian army and Russia’s military-industrial complex time to gain strength and prepare for a future invasion. That’s precisely what happened between 2014 and 2022. If Ukrainians are going to acquiesce to what promises to be a long Russian occupation of roughly a fifth of their country, they need the credible deterrence that only NATO can offer.
In such a compromise, the timing of NATO’s announcement that it is offering membership to Ukraine will also matter a great deal. The alliance must issue the formal invitation the day Zelensky and Putin agree to stop fighting. After NATO invites Ukraine to join, member states must ratify the country’s accession quickly. Trump must personally signal his unequivocal support so that other NATO leaders do not drag out the ratification process. Right now, Trump has tremendous political capital to wield over some of these potential holdouts, including Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban and Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico. He should use this leverage early in his presidency to secure a swift deal and bring the dreadful war in Ukraine to an end.
A VICTORY DAY FOR ALL
Skeptics argue that Putin will never accept Ukraine’s joining NATO. But Ukraine and NATO members do not need to ask for Putin’s permission. Putin has no place in negotiations between Ukraine and the alliance. Allowing him to disrupt or put off these deliberations would be a sign of American weakness not only to Moscow but also to Beijing.
These skeptics also grossly overestimate Putin’s concern about Ukraine’s joining NATO. Putin did not invade Ukraine in 2022 to stop NATO’s expansion. In the run-up to 2022, NATO membership for Ukraine was a distant dream, and everyone in Brussels, Kyiv, Moscow, and Washington knew it. Putin’s invasion had other objectives: to unite Ukrainians and Russians into one Slavic nation, overthrow Ukraine’s democratic and Western-oriented government, and demilitarize the country. Putin barely raised an eyebrow when Finland and Sweden joined NATO in 2023 and 2024, even though Finland shares an 830-mile border with Russia. His war has driven Ukraine ever closer to NATO, not pulled it away.
But if the Russians insist that Ukraine’s joining the alliance threatens Russia—and they will—Trump can explain to Putin that NATO membership will constrain Ukraine. Zelensky, of course, will never formally recognize the Russian annexation of occupied Ukrainian territory. Yet the possibility of NATO membership could lead him to agree to a formula in which Kyiv accepts that it will seek the reunification of Ukraine only through peaceful means. West Germany and South Korea agreed to similar terms in return for defense treaties with NATO and the United States. As a condition for joining the alliance, Zelensky and his generals could also be obligated to withdraw Ukrainian soldiers from the Russian region of Kursk, where they have maintained positions since August. NATO is a defensive alliance. It has never attacked the Soviet Union or Russia, and it never will. Putin knows that.
Trump should secure a swift deal and bring the dreadful war in Ukraine to an end.
If appropriately timed to happen when the war ends, the day that Ukraine is invited to join NATO will also be the most glorious day in Putin’s career. He will be able to proclaim to the Russian people and the world that his invasion was a success, that he has “won.” He will hold a victory parade on Red Square with Chinese, Iranian, and North Korean leaders at his side atop Lenin’s tomb. He will claim a place in Russian history books next to Peter the Great, Catherine the Great, and Stalin as a Kremlin leader who expanded the borders of the Russian empire. On this alleged “victory day,” he will not want to spoil his triumph by starting another war or threatening one to try to block Ukraine’s membership in NATO.
Some politicians in NATO countries, including Germany and Hungary, have expressed worries that Ukraine’s admission to the alliance could trigger World War III. They argue that because some of the country is in Russian hands, a wider war is inevitable if Ukraine becomes a NATO member. This analysis is flawed. After three years of painful war with Ukraine, Putin has no appetite to fight the most powerful alliance in the world, anchored by the U.S. military, the world’s best. The Russian army has endured tremendous losses while making only incremental gains on the battlefield against an under-armed and undermanned Ukrainian foe. Putin will not dare to go to war with the mighty U.S. armed forces and their allies after some 78,000 Russian soldiers have been killed in Ukraine—a figure that, according to some estimates, grows to between 400,000 and 600,000 when including Russian soldiers wounded in the fighting. The Kremlin is scrambling for manpower, and its military enterprises are struggling to replenish Russia’s most sophisticated weapons because of ongoing sanctions.
German leaders, in particular, should understand the advantages of NATO membership for a divided country. West Germany joined NATO in 1955. That act did not spark World War III, even though West Berlin was surrounded by East German territory. Just the opposite: NATO membership helped keep the peace. On its own, West Germany might not have survived with the Soviet Red Army just across the border in East Germany.
More broadly, Europe would benefit economically from a stable and secure Ukraine. NATO allies would no longer need to provide billions in economic assistance to Kyiv or care for the millions of Ukrainian refugees straining welfare systems in European countries. Just as NATO facilitated the economic development of Western Europe during the Cold War, Ukraine’s membership in NATO would help the economies of all NATO allies benefit from trade with and investment in a booming postwar Ukrainian economy. The U.S. economy would benefit, too, especially from access to Ukraine’s critical minerals for advanced batteries and other vital technologies, which could help reduce American dependence on more unreliable autocratic suppliers.
MAN IN THE MIDDLE
Of course, one more person needs to be convinced of the merits of this peace plan: Trump. Given his past skepticism about aid to Ukraine and NATO more generally, it will not be easy to persuade him to take this path. Such a deal, however, supports several of Trump’s objectives. By bringing Ukraine into NATO, Trump could achieve a significant victory for one of his foreign policy priorities: burden-sharing. After joining NATO, Ukraine’s armed forces would overnight become the best and most experienced European army in the alliance. Ukrainian soldiers could be deployed to other frontline states, allowing Washington to reduce its own troop commitments. Ukraine could also supply other NATO allies, especially those that share a border with Russia, with the air, sea, and land drones that the Ukrainian military has mastered in its defense of the country. Trump could explain to the American people that Ukraine’s membership in NATO would allow the United States to spend less on European defense and free up resources to contain China’s growing influence in the Asia-Pacific region. Such a move should win the support of the many China hawks in Trump’s new administration.
This plan would prevent the kind of collapse and conquest that followed the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021. It would also produce a lasting peace in Europe, not a temporary cease-fire easily broken by Russia in the future. If Trump succeeded in brokering this settlement, he could become a candidate for the Nobel Peace Prize, an honor he covets.
The odds may be stacked against such a plan. Neither Putin nor Zelensky will be easily coaxed to the table, and Trump might resent the imperative of having to maintain, and even expand, support for Ukraine as a means to force negotiations. But an endless war or capitulation to Putin would be far worse.
