Traditionally, all technology flows downstream from militarization. Every country that rose to superpower status found ways to weaponize existing strengths - economic, social and military - in global geopolitics. This was while the state armed up to become globally competitive. Germany, Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Japan and the US have been through several iterations of militarization through their respective histories. It is also no surprise that they industrialized rapidly.
China most recently joined the club and achieved much in a short span of time. Since the state sees hard power as a precondition for national stability and party unity, Beijing saw every element of national power as a potential weapon. By concertedly generating rapid economic gains, China could reinvest in its military-technology complex. By capturing market share in manufactured goods, it could finance its next stage of development. This paid rich dividends across the broader innovation ecosystem and economy. The second and third order effects are enormous, and in many ways, China is attempting to replicate what the US has done for over a century.
Undergirding this approach is a deep national desire for dominance, control and expansion. This desire does not exist in a vacuum. Rather, it grows out of a real need for controlling external variables with the intent of securing the domestic front. History is replete with such examples in which scarcity and competition drive innovation and growth. Emerging from this is national power which guarantee further economic success. It typically continues to the point that demographics, over-financialization, war losses and social fissures fail the country.
India did not participate in the last three waves of militarization spanning the First World War to the Cold War and beyond. India was a colony, and for much of its post-colonial history, the country focused on simply preserving territorial integrity with the minimum required technological intervention. This mindset has changed because of the emergence of next-generation technology threats from China.
Ultimately, India’s innovation ecosystem will prove to be an outgrowth of its need to maintain sovereignty. The country is still behind the curve in many domains like robotics and AI, but at the least, a sense urgency has picked up. As India develops cutting edge weapons systems, it must also take an integrated approach to cultivating broad spectrum comprehensive national power. In the same way an advanced military acts as a force multiplier for diplomacy, globally competitive R&D and manufacturing capabilities give teeth to trade negotiations. This the big boys’ game which guarantees growth and stability from high levels of total economic size.
In short, for India to deliver 7-8% growth compounded over two to three decades, it must militarize indigenously, from ground up as much as possible. The learnings from this exercise will take the country far, as much as the output will help its leaders capitalize on opportunities in global geopolitics and trade.
