I accept losses are part of combat. I am not under any illusion like the subhumans across the border that they have not lost any anything. What I was screaming on top of my lungs right from the day the terror attack happened was, this time there won't be any element of surprise. So we got to bide our time and then retaliate. I specifically even said even though many disagreed strongly here, that we must strike them at the onset of winter. That will give us enough time to prepare and improvise and most importantly make sure Chinese are kept away from the conflict while we can engage the Pakis in a long duration conflict.
Okay, we wanted revenge immediately. Apparently, Modi and his ilk didn't want to waste time and hit them sooner after 15 days. You attacked them without an element of surprise. Now, why the fuck did you give orders to them not to do SEAD and DEAD before striking them? I want to take a giant swing at that haramkore who suggested we should not hit their military assets. I am sick and fed up of our supreme leader who still after 10 years has not understood Paki military and terrorists are part of the same coin. What the fuck he is smoking? I literally said in this very forum, whether you attack only their terror infrastructure or you hit their military assets or both, the Porki retaliation will only be targeting our military assets.
There is only one way to redeem from this fiasco, let our supreme leader order a preemptive strike on their terror infrastructure which anyway will come up in few months and also their military assets in few months time. Tell all the branches of military now, winter is coming and ask them to prepare for a massive strike against Pork land in few months time.
it's not the mudi who is deciding this, it's our security establishment as an institution. the current decision makers need to find creative ways within the redlines. issue with trying to answering your question, it would be highly speculative.
was looking into evolution of nooclear redlines of India and pak, dumping the entire thing here for future reference.
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Operation Parakram, conducted by India in 2001–2002 following the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament, prompted significant discussion within Pakistan regarding its nuclear doctrine, particularly concerning its nuclear redlines. Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine has historically been characterized by strategic ambiguity, lacking a formalized public document, which allows flexibility but risks miscalculation during crises. The commentary from within Pakistan post-Parakram focused on refining these redlines, deterrence credibility, and responses to India’s conventional military posture, notably its Cold Start Doctrine.
### Context of Operation Parakram and Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine
Operation Parakram involved a massive Indian military mobilization along the border with Pakistan, raising fears of escalation to conventional or nuclear conflict. Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine, centered on deterrence against India, relies on the threat of nuclear retaliation to counter India’s conventional superiority. The doctrine emphasizes a "first-use" policy, with nuclear weapons as a last resort to protect national survival. Following Parakram, Pakistani strategists and policymakers debated the clarity and thresholds of nuclear redlines, which are critical triggers for nuclear use.
### Key Redlines Articulated Post-Parakram
In 2002, Lieutenant General Khalid Kidwai, head of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division (SPD), publicly outlined four key nuclear redlines, a rare clarification of Pakistan’s otherwise ambiguous doctrine. These redlines, as discussed in Pakistani strategic circles, were:
1. **Spatial Threshold**: If Indian forces penetrate deep into Pakistani territory, threatening significant territorial losses.
2. **Military Threshold**: If India destroys a large part of Pakistan’s land or air forces, crippling its conventional capabilities.
3. **Economic Threshold**: If India imposes an economic blockade, such as a naval blockade, strangling Pakistan’s economy.
4. **Political Threshold**: If India destabilizes Pakistan internally, through subversion or incitement of large-scale unrest.
These redlines were reiterated and debated within Pakistan as a response to India’s aggressive posturing during Parakram, which was perceived as testing Pakistan’s nuclear thresholds. The articulation aimed to signal to India and the international community that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal was a credible deterrent against any existential threat.
### Commentary Within Pakistan
1. **Need for Clarity in Redlines**:
- Pakistani analysts, such as those writing for think tanks like the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI), emphasized the need for clearer redlines to avoid miscalculations. The ambiguity surrounding nuclear thresholds was seen as both a strength (deterring India through uncertainty) and a weakness (risking unintended escalation). Post-Parakram, some argued for refining these redlines to ensure India understood the consequences of crossing them without compromising strategic flexibility.[](https://www.paradigmshift.com.pk/nuclear-pakistan/)
2. **Response to India’s Cold Start Doctrine**:
- Operation Parakram exposed vulnerabilities in Pakistan’s conventional forces, prompting India to develop the Cold Start Doctrine, a strategy for rapid, limited conventional strikes to seize Pakistani territory before nuclear escalation. Pakistani commentary, particularly in military and strategic journals, focused on countering this through tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) like the Nasr missile. Analysts argued that TNWs lowered the nuclear threshold, reinforcing deterrence by signaling Pakistan’s readiness to use nuclear weapons in response to limited incursions, thus blurring the line between conventional and nuclear conflict.[](https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/pakistan-s-tactical-nuclear-weapons-limit-india-s-conventional-military-options)[](https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/AD1021787.pdf)
3. **Debate on Strategic Ambiguity**:
- Within Pakistan, there was a split in strategic thought. Some, like Pervez Hoodbhoy, cautioned that ambiguity and an expansive interpretation of redlines (e.g., economic or political destabilization) could lead to miscalculations, especially under crisis conditions like Parakram. Others, including military strategists, defended ambiguity as a necessary deterrent, arguing that clear redlines might embolden India to test Pakistan’s limits just short of nuclear use. This debate was evident in discussions hosted by organizations like the Centre for Aerospace and Security Studies (CASS).[](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25751654.2019.1619229)
4. **Musharraf’s Statements and Public Discourse**:
- Then-President Pervez Musharraf’s 2002 statement that nuclear weapons would only be used if “the very existence of Pakistan as a state” was threatened was widely discussed. Pakistani media and strategic analysts interpreted this as reinforcing the redlines while maintaining ambiguity about specific triggers. Musharraf’s remarks aimed to reassure domestic audiences of Pakistan’s resolve while cautioning India against misadventure. However, some analysts criticized the lack of a formal doctrine, arguing it left room for misinterpretation during crises.[](https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/52086/ssoar-indrastraglobal-2017-6-mishra-Pakistans_Nuclear_Threshold_Not_as.pdf?sequence=1)
5. **Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Escalation Control**:
- Post-Parakram, Pakistan accelerated development of TNWs to address perceived gaps in deterrence, particularly against India’s conventional advances. Commentary in Pakistani defense circles, such as in publications by the National Defence University (NDU), highlighted TNWs as a means to enforce redlines at lower levels of conflict, deterring India’s Cold Start-style operations. However, critics within Pakistan, including some retired military officers, warned that TNWs risked lowering the nuclear threshold, potentially escalating conflicts prematurely.[](https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/pakistan-s-tactical-nuclear-weapons-limit-india-s-conventional-military-options)[](https://ndujournal.ndu.edu.pk/site/article/download/69/54)
6. **Domestic and International Perceptions**:
- Pakistani commentators expressed concern over international perceptions of Pakistan’s nuclear posture post-Parakram. The crisis highlighted the risks of nuclear escalation in South Asia, prompting calls within Pakistan for stronger command-and-control mechanisms to signal responsible stewardship of nuclear weapons. This was seen as critical to maintaining international legitimacy while reinforcing deterrence. Articles in outlets like *Dawn* and *The News* stressed the need for robust crisis management to prevent redlines from being misinterpreted.
### Broader Implications
The commentary within Pakistan underscored a tension between maintaining strategic ambiguity and providing enough clarity to deter India effectively. Operation Parakram was a wake-up call, revealing the need for Pakistan to adapt its nuclear doctrine to India’s evolving conventional strategies. The development of TNWs and the articulation of redlines were direct outcomes of this period, aimed at ensuring deterrence credibility. However, the lack of a formal doctrine continued to spark debate, with some analysts advocating for a written policy to reduce risks of miscalculation, while others saw ambiguity as a strategic asset.
### Sources
The analysis draws on insights from strategic discussions within Pakistan, as reflected in think tank reports, academic journals, and media commentary. Specific references include:
- Paradigm Shift on Pakistan’s nuclear ambiguity and risks of miscalculation.[](https://www.paradigmshift.com.pk/nuclear-pakistan/)
- Musharraf’s 2002 statements on nuclear use thresholds.[](https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/52086/ssoar-indrastraglobal-2017-6-mishra-Pakistans_Nuclear_Threshold_Not_as.pdf?sequence=1)
- Pakistani strategic responses to India’s Cold Start Doctrine.[](https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/pakistan-s-tactical-nuclear-weapons-limit-india-s-conventional-military-options)[](https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/AD1021787.pdf)[](https://ndujournal.ndu.edu.pk/site/article/download/69/54)
- Debates on nuclear thresholds and ambiguity.[](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25751654.2019.1619229)
For further details, readers may consult primary sources such as statements from Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division or analyses in Pakistani defense journals like those published by the NDU or ISSI. If additional primary source material or specific articles from within Pakistan are desired, I can assist in searching for them, provided the user confirms the need for such research.
Lieutenant General Khalid Kidwai, then head of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division (SPD), articulated Pakistan’s nuclear redlines in an interview with the Italian research group Landau Network-Centro Volta in January 2002. The statements were made during a visit by the group’s researchers, Paolo Cotta-Ramusino and Maurizio Martellini, to Pakistan, where they met with Kidwai and other officials. The interview was published in a report by the Landau Network-Centro Volta, titled “Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Stability and Nuclear Strategy in Pakistan,” released in March 2002.
In this report, Kidwai outlined four specific thresholds for nuclear use:
spatial (deep Indian penetration into Pakistani territory),
military (destruction of a significant portion of Pakistan’s forces),
economic (e.g., a naval blockade strangling Pakistan’s economy),
and political (destruction of the state through internal subversion).
These remarks were a rare public clarification of Pakistan’s nuclear redlines, prompted by the tensions following Operation Parakram (December 2001–October 2002).
The exact date of the interview is noted as January 2002 in the report, though a specific day is not provided. The report itself is accessible through archives of strategic studies or non-proliferation research repositories, such as the Landau Network’s publications or references in academic works on South Asian nuclear strategy. If further verification or access to the original document is required, I can assist with a search for available sources, upon your confirmation.
India’s nuclear weapons doctrine was first formally enunciated on **August 17, 1999**, when the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) released the **Draft Nuclear Doctrine (DND)**. This followed India’s nuclear tests in May 1998 (Pokhran-II), which necessitated a clear articulation of India’s nuclear policy. The doctrine was later formalized, with refinements, by the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) on **January 4, 2003**, through an official press release that outlined key elements of India’s nuclear posture. Below is an overview of the initial doctrine and the changes or debates surrounding it over time, based on available information.
### Initial Enunciation: Draft Nuclear Doctrine (August 17, 1999)
The 1999 DND, prepared by the NSAB under the chairmanship of K. Subrahmanyam, laid out the foundational principles of India’s nuclear policy. Key elements included:
1. **No First Use (NFU)**: India would not initiate nuclear weapons use but would retaliate massively if attacked with nuclear weapons.
2. **Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD)**: India would maintain a nuclear arsenal sufficient to deter adversaries, particularly Pakistan and China, without pursuing an arms race.
3. **Massive Retaliation**: In response to a nuclear attack, India would inflict unacceptable damage on the aggressor, targeting population centers and strategic assets.
4. **Civilian Control**: Nuclear weapons use would be authorized only by the civilian political leadership, specifically the Prime Minister or a designated successor.
5. **Non-Use Against Non-Nuclear States**: India pledged not to use nuclear weapons against states without nuclear capabilities, unless such states allied with a nuclear power against India.
6. **Retaliation to Chemical/Biological Attacks**: The doctrine reserved the right to respond with nuclear weapons to a major chemical or biological attack.
The DND emphasized strategic restraint, reflecting India’s aim to project itself as a responsible nuclear power. However, as a draft, it was not an official policy but a framework for discussion, intended to guide India’s nuclear strategy.
### Formalization: January 4, 2003
On January 4, 2003, the CCS adopted a refined version of the nuclear doctrine, formalized through a press release by the Ministry of External Affairs. This version retained the core principles of the 1999 DND but introduced clarifications and adjustments, particularly in response to strategic developments like Operation Parakram (2001–2002) and Pakistan’s nuclear posture. Key points included:
1. **Reaffirmation of NFU and CMD**: The doctrine reiterated India’s commitment to no first use and a credible minimum deterrent, with an arsenal sized to deter threats from Pakistan and China.
2. **Massive Retaliation Clarified**: The 2003 statement explicitly stated that India would respond with “massive nuclear retaliation” to a nuclear attack, designed to inflict “unacceptable damage.” This was seen as a response to Pakistan’s first-use policy and its articulation of nuclear redlines in 2002.
3. **Response to Chemical/Biological Attacks Expanded**: The doctrine broadened the scope of retaliation to include nuclear responses to “a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere,” as well as major chemical or biological attacks, signaling a wider deterrence umbrella.
4. **Robust Command and Control**: Emphasis was placed on a survivable nuclear arsenal, with measures to ensure robust command, control, and communication systems to withstand a first strike.
The 2003 doctrine was more concise than the 1999 draft and reflected India’s response to strategic challenges, including Pakistan’s development of tactical nuclear weapons and India’s own conventional military restructuring (e.g., the Cold Start Doctrine, publicly unveiled in April 2004).
### Changes and Debates Over Time
India’s nuclear doctrine has not undergone formal revisions since 2003, but several developments, statements, and strategic debates have suggested potential shifts or reinterpretations. These include:
1. **Debates on No First Use (NFU)**:
- **2003–2010**: The NFU policy faced scrutiny within India, particularly after Pakistan’s development of tactical nuclear weapons (e.g., the Nasr missile) and its ambiguous redlines. Some strategists argued that NFU constrained India’s ability to deter limited nuclear use by Pakistan. However, official statements consistently reaffirmed NFU.
- **2016–2019**: Remarks by senior officials sparked debates about NFU’s rigidity. In 2016, then-Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar questioned the wisdom of a strict NFU policy, suggesting India should not “bind” itself in advance, though he clarified this was a personal view. In 2019, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh stated that NFU was India’s policy “for now,” hinting at potential future reassessment. These remarks fueled speculation but did not result in a formal policy change.
- **Academic and Strategic Discourse**: Analysts like Bharat Karnad and retired military officials have advocated for abandoning NFU to adopt a more flexible posture, arguing it would strengthen deterrence against Pakistan’s low-threshold nuclear threats. However, the government has not officially altered NFU.
2. **Response to Tactical Nuclear Weapons**:
- Pakistan’s deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in the 2010s prompted discussions within India about whether massive retaliation was credible against limited nuclear strikes. Some strategists suggested a shift to “proportionate response” or “flexible retaliation” to maintain deterrence without escalating to all-out nuclear war. However, the official doctrine retains the massive retaliation clause, emphasizing its deterrent value.
3. **Technological Advancements**:
- India’s development of advanced delivery systems, such as the Agni-V intercontinental ballistic missile (tested in 2012) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (e.g., INS Arihant, operationalized in 2016), enhanced the credibility of its second-strike capability. These advancements aligned with the CMD principle but raised questions about the size of India’s arsenal, with some arguing for a larger force to deter China.
- The development of ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems, like the Prithvi Air Defence and Advanced Air Defence systems, introduced debates about whether BMD could undermine CMD by encouraging a larger arsenal or preemptive strategies. No doctrinal changes have explicitly incorporated BMD.
4. **Strategic Context and China**:
- The 2003 doctrine was primarily focused on Pakistan, but India’s growing rivalry with China, particularly after the 2020 Galwan Valley clash, has shifted attention to deterring China. The Agni-V and plans for multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) reflect efforts to bolster deterrence against China’s larger nuclear arsenal. Some analysts argue that CMD may need recalibration to address a two-front threat (Pakistan and China), but no formal doctrinal shift has occurred.
5. **Political and Strategic Ambiguity**:
- India has maintained strategic ambiguity in some aspects of its doctrine, particularly regarding the size of its arsenal and specific retaliation scenarios. While the 2003 doctrine clarified massive retaliation, it avoided detailing thresholds or operational plans, preserving flexibility.
- In 2018, India’s ratification of the Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its continued engagement with the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) reinforced its image as a responsible nuclear power, aligning with the doctrine’s emphasis on restraint.
### Current Status (as of May 21, 2025)
As of the current date, India’s nuclear doctrine remains anchored in the 2003 CCS statement, with NFU, CMD, and massive retaliation as its core tenets. No official revisions have been announced, despite debates and occasional statements suggesting flexibility. The doctrine’s evolution has been shaped more by technological advancements and strategic responses to Pakistan and China than by formal policy changes. India’s nuclear arsenal, estimated at 160–170 warheads (based on 2023–2024 estimates from non-proliferation sources like SIPRI), continues to grow modestly, consistent with CMD.
### Sources
- **Draft Nuclear Doctrine (1999)**: Released by the National Security Advisory Board, August 17, 1999, published on the Ministry of External Affairs website and Pugwash Conferences archives.
- **CCS Press Release (2003)**: Ministry of External Affairs, “The Cabinet Committee on Security Reviews Operationalization of India’s Nuclear Doctrine,” January 4, 2003.
- **Strategic Analyses**: Reports from think tanks like the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) and articles in journals such as *Strategic Analysis* discussing NFU debates and technological impacts.
- **Public Statements**: Remarks by Manohar Parrikar (2016) and Rajnath Singh (2019), reported in Indian media outlets like *The Hindu* and *The Times of India*.
- **Non-Proliferation Sources**: SIPRI Yearbooks and Federation of American Scientists (FAS) reports on India’s nuclear arsenal and doctrine debates.
