Operation Sindoor and Aftermath

Mail-SPL-468-X60-2x
Even after 70 years , we don't understand it ?
Looks like congresses era policy paralysis in certain things is not over till now.
Tom Cooper was astonished by this display of poor judgment by India. Striking terrorist installations in Pakistan without first conducting SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses) shows a serious lack of strategic sense. This is not the time to try and be clever—just follow standard military protocol, as armed forces around the world do: neutralize enemy air defenses first, then proceed to target terrorist infrastructure.
 
I accept losses are part of combat. I am not under any illusion like the subhumans across the border that they have not lost any anything. What I was screaming on top of my lungs right from the day the terror attack happened was, this time there won't be any element of surprise. So we got to bide our time and then retaliate. I specifically even said even though many disagreed strongly here, that we must strike them at the onset of winter. That will give us enough time to prepare and improvise and most importantly make sure Chinese are kept away from the conflict while we can engage the Pakis in a long duration conflict.

Okay, we wanted revenge immediately. Apparently, Modi and his ilk didn't want to waste time and hit them sooner after 15 days. You attacked them without an element of surprise. Now, why the fuck did you give orders to them not to do SEAD and DEAD before striking them? I want to take a giant swing at that haramkore who suggested we should not hit their military assets. I am sick and fed up of our supreme leader who still after 10 years has not understood Paki military and terrorists are part of the same coin. What the fuck he is smoking? I literally said in this very forum, whether you attack only their terror infrastructure or you hit their military assets or both, the Porki retaliation will only be targeting our military assets.

There is only one way to redeem from this fiasco, let our supreme leader order a preemptive strike on their terror infrastructure which anyway will come up in few months and also their military assets in few months time. Tell all the branches of military now, winter is coming and ask them to prepare for a massive strike against Pork land in few months time.

it's not the mudi who is deciding this, it's our security establishment as an institution. the current decision makers need to find creative ways within the redlines. issue with trying to answering your question, it would be highly speculative.

was looking into evolution of nooclear redlines of India and pak, dumping the entire thing here for future reference.

======

Operation Parakram, conducted by India in 2001–2002 following the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament, prompted significant discussion within Pakistan regarding its nuclear doctrine, particularly concerning its nuclear redlines. Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine has historically been characterized by strategic ambiguity, lacking a formalized public document, which allows flexibility but risks miscalculation during crises. The commentary from within Pakistan post-Parakram focused on refining these redlines, deterrence credibility, and responses to India’s conventional military posture, notably its Cold Start Doctrine.

### Context of Operation Parakram and Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine
Operation Parakram involved a massive Indian military mobilization along the border with Pakistan, raising fears of escalation to conventional or nuclear conflict. Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine, centered on deterrence against India, relies on the threat of nuclear retaliation to counter India’s conventional superiority. The doctrine emphasizes a "first-use" policy, with nuclear weapons as a last resort to protect national survival. Following Parakram, Pakistani strategists and policymakers debated the clarity and thresholds of nuclear redlines, which are critical triggers for nuclear use.

### Key Redlines Articulated Post-Parakram
In 2002, Lieutenant General Khalid Kidwai, head of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division (SPD), publicly outlined four key nuclear redlines, a rare clarification of Pakistan’s otherwise ambiguous doctrine. These redlines, as discussed in Pakistani strategic circles, were:

1. **Spatial Threshold**: If Indian forces penetrate deep into Pakistani territory, threatening significant territorial losses.
2. **Military Threshold**: If India destroys a large part of Pakistan’s land or air forces, crippling its conventional capabilities.
3. **Economic Threshold**: If India imposes an economic blockade, such as a naval blockade, strangling Pakistan’s economy.
4. **Political Threshold**: If India destabilizes Pakistan internally, through subversion or incitement of large-scale unrest.

These redlines were reiterated and debated within Pakistan as a response to India’s aggressive posturing during Parakram, which was perceived as testing Pakistan’s nuclear thresholds. The articulation aimed to signal to India and the international community that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal was a credible deterrent against any existential threat.

### Commentary Within Pakistan
1. **Need for Clarity in Redlines**:
- Pakistani analysts, such as those writing for think tanks like the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI), emphasized the need for clearer redlines to avoid miscalculations. The ambiguity surrounding nuclear thresholds was seen as both a strength (deterring India through uncertainty) and a weakness (risking unintended escalation). Post-Parakram, some argued for refining these redlines to ensure India understood the consequences of crossing them without compromising strategic flexibility.[](https://www.paradigmshift.com.pk/nuclear-pakistan/)

2. **Response to India’s Cold Start Doctrine**:
- Operation Parakram exposed vulnerabilities in Pakistan’s conventional forces, prompting India to develop the Cold Start Doctrine, a strategy for rapid, limited conventional strikes to seize Pakistani territory before nuclear escalation. Pakistani commentary, particularly in military and strategic journals, focused on countering this through tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) like the Nasr missile. Analysts argued that TNWs lowered the nuclear threshold, reinforcing deterrence by signaling Pakistan’s readiness to use nuclear weapons in response to limited incursions, thus blurring the line between conventional and nuclear conflict.[](https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/pakistan-s-tactical-nuclear-weapons-limit-india-s-conventional-military-options)[](https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/AD1021787.pdf)

3. **Debate on Strategic Ambiguity**:
- Within Pakistan, there was a split in strategic thought. Some, like Pervez Hoodbhoy, cautioned that ambiguity and an expansive interpretation of redlines (e.g., economic or political destabilization) could lead to miscalculations, especially under crisis conditions like Parakram. Others, including military strategists, defended ambiguity as a necessary deterrent, arguing that clear redlines might embolden India to test Pakistan’s limits just short of nuclear use. This debate was evident in discussions hosted by organizations like the Centre for Aerospace and Security Studies (CASS).[](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25751654.2019.1619229)

4. **Musharraf’s Statements and Public Discourse**:
- Then-President Pervez Musharraf’s 2002 statement that nuclear weapons would only be used if “the very existence of Pakistan as a state” was threatened was widely discussed. Pakistani media and strategic analysts interpreted this as reinforcing the redlines while maintaining ambiguity about specific triggers. Musharraf’s remarks aimed to reassure domestic audiences of Pakistan’s resolve while cautioning India against misadventure. However, some analysts criticized the lack of a formal doctrine, arguing it left room for misinterpretation during crises.[](https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/52086/ssoar-indrastraglobal-2017-6-mishra-Pakistans_Nuclear_Threshold_Not_as.pdf?sequence=1)

5. **Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Escalation Control**:
- Post-Parakram, Pakistan accelerated development of TNWs to address perceived gaps in deterrence, particularly against India’s conventional advances. Commentary in Pakistani defense circles, such as in publications by the National Defence University (NDU), highlighted TNWs as a means to enforce redlines at lower levels of conflict, deterring India’s Cold Start-style operations. However, critics within Pakistan, including some retired military officers, warned that TNWs risked lowering the nuclear threshold, potentially escalating conflicts prematurely.[](https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/pakistan-s-tactical-nuclear-weapons-limit-india-s-conventional-military-options)[](https://ndujournal.ndu.edu.pk/site/article/download/69/54)

6. **Domestic and International Perceptions**:
- Pakistani commentators expressed concern over international perceptions of Pakistan’s nuclear posture post-Parakram. The crisis highlighted the risks of nuclear escalation in South Asia, prompting calls within Pakistan for stronger command-and-control mechanisms to signal responsible stewardship of nuclear weapons. This was seen as critical to maintaining international legitimacy while reinforcing deterrence. Articles in outlets like *Dawn* and *The News* stressed the need for robust crisis management to prevent redlines from being misinterpreted.

### Broader Implications
The commentary within Pakistan underscored a tension between maintaining strategic ambiguity and providing enough clarity to deter India effectively. Operation Parakram was a wake-up call, revealing the need for Pakistan to adapt its nuclear doctrine to India’s evolving conventional strategies. The development of TNWs and the articulation of redlines were direct outcomes of this period, aimed at ensuring deterrence credibility. However, the lack of a formal doctrine continued to spark debate, with some analysts advocating for a written policy to reduce risks of miscalculation, while others saw ambiguity as a strategic asset.

### Sources
The analysis draws on insights from strategic discussions within Pakistan, as reflected in think tank reports, academic journals, and media commentary. Specific references include:
- Paradigm Shift on Pakistan’s nuclear ambiguity and risks of miscalculation.[](https://www.paradigmshift.com.pk/nuclear-pakistan/)
- Musharraf’s 2002 statements on nuclear use thresholds.[](https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/52086/ssoar-indrastraglobal-2017-6-mishra-Pakistans_Nuclear_Threshold_Not_as.pdf?sequence=1)
- Pakistani strategic responses to India’s Cold Start Doctrine.[](https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/pakistan-s-tactical-nuclear-weapons-limit-india-s-conventional-military-options)[](https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/AD1021787.pdf)[](https://ndujournal.ndu.edu.pk/site/article/download/69/54)
- Debates on nuclear thresholds and ambiguity.[](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25751654.2019.1619229)

For further details, readers may consult primary sources such as statements from Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division or analyses in Pakistani defense journals like those published by the NDU or ISSI. If additional primary source material or specific articles from within Pakistan are desired, I can assist in searching for them, provided the user confirms the need for such research.

Lieutenant General Khalid Kidwai, then head of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division (SPD), articulated Pakistan’s nuclear redlines in an interview with the Italian research group Landau Network-Centro Volta in January 2002. The statements were made during a visit by the group’s researchers, Paolo Cotta-Ramusino and Maurizio Martellini, to Pakistan, where they met with Kidwai and other officials. The interview was published in a report by the Landau Network-Centro Volta, titled “Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Stability and Nuclear Strategy in Pakistan,” released in March 2002.

In this report, Kidwai outlined four specific thresholds for nuclear use:
spatial (deep Indian penetration into Pakistani territory),
military (destruction of a significant portion of Pakistan’s forces),
economic (e.g., a naval blockade strangling Pakistan’s economy),
and political (destruction of the state through internal subversion).

These remarks were a rare public clarification of Pakistan’s nuclear redlines, prompted by the tensions following Operation Parakram (December 2001–October 2002).

The exact date of the interview is noted as January 2002 in the report, though a specific day is not provided. The report itself is accessible through archives of strategic studies or non-proliferation research repositories, such as the Landau Network’s publications or references in academic works on South Asian nuclear strategy. If further verification or access to the original document is required, I can assist with a search for available sources, upon your confirmation.

India’s nuclear weapons doctrine was first formally enunciated on **August 17, 1999**, when the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) released the **Draft Nuclear Doctrine (DND)**. This followed India’s nuclear tests in May 1998 (Pokhran-II), which necessitated a clear articulation of India’s nuclear policy. The doctrine was later formalized, with refinements, by the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) on **January 4, 2003**, through an official press release that outlined key elements of India’s nuclear posture. Below is an overview of the initial doctrine and the changes or debates surrounding it over time, based on available information.

### Initial Enunciation: Draft Nuclear Doctrine (August 17, 1999)
The 1999 DND, prepared by the NSAB under the chairmanship of K. Subrahmanyam, laid out the foundational principles of India’s nuclear policy. Key elements included:

1. **No First Use (NFU)**: India would not initiate nuclear weapons use but would retaliate massively if attacked with nuclear weapons.
2. **Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD)**: India would maintain a nuclear arsenal sufficient to deter adversaries, particularly Pakistan and China, without pursuing an arms race.
3. **Massive Retaliation**: In response to a nuclear attack, India would inflict unacceptable damage on the aggressor, targeting population centers and strategic assets.
4. **Civilian Control**: Nuclear weapons use would be authorized only by the civilian political leadership, specifically the Prime Minister or a designated successor.
5. **Non-Use Against Non-Nuclear States**: India pledged not to use nuclear weapons against states without nuclear capabilities, unless such states allied with a nuclear power against India.
6. **Retaliation to Chemical/Biological Attacks**: The doctrine reserved the right to respond with nuclear weapons to a major chemical or biological attack.

The DND emphasized strategic restraint, reflecting India’s aim to project itself as a responsible nuclear power. However, as a draft, it was not an official policy but a framework for discussion, intended to guide India’s nuclear strategy.

### Formalization: January 4, 2003
On January 4, 2003, the CCS adopted a refined version of the nuclear doctrine, formalized through a press release by the Ministry of External Affairs. This version retained the core principles of the 1999 DND but introduced clarifications and adjustments, particularly in response to strategic developments like Operation Parakram (2001–2002) and Pakistan’s nuclear posture. Key points included:

1. **Reaffirmation of NFU and CMD**: The doctrine reiterated India’s commitment to no first use and a credible minimum deterrent, with an arsenal sized to deter threats from Pakistan and China.
2. **Massive Retaliation Clarified**: The 2003 statement explicitly stated that India would respond with “massive nuclear retaliation” to a nuclear attack, designed to inflict “unacceptable damage.” This was seen as a response to Pakistan’s first-use policy and its articulation of nuclear redlines in 2002.
3. **Response to Chemical/Biological Attacks Expanded**: The doctrine broadened the scope of retaliation to include nuclear responses to “a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere,” as well as major chemical or biological attacks, signaling a wider deterrence umbrella.
4. **Robust Command and Control**: Emphasis was placed on a survivable nuclear arsenal, with measures to ensure robust command, control, and communication systems to withstand a first strike.

The 2003 doctrine was more concise than the 1999 draft and reflected India’s response to strategic challenges, including Pakistan’s development of tactical nuclear weapons and India’s own conventional military restructuring (e.g., the Cold Start Doctrine, publicly unveiled in April 2004).

### Changes and Debates Over Time
India’s nuclear doctrine has not undergone formal revisions since 2003, but several developments, statements, and strategic debates have suggested potential shifts or reinterpretations. These include:

1. **Debates on No First Use (NFU)**:
- **2003–2010**: The NFU policy faced scrutiny within India, particularly after Pakistan’s development of tactical nuclear weapons (e.g., the Nasr missile) and its ambiguous redlines. Some strategists argued that NFU constrained India’s ability to deter limited nuclear use by Pakistan. However, official statements consistently reaffirmed NFU.
- **2016–2019**: Remarks by senior officials sparked debates about NFU’s rigidity. In 2016, then-Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar questioned the wisdom of a strict NFU policy, suggesting India should not “bind” itself in advance, though he clarified this was a personal view. In 2019, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh stated that NFU was India’s policy “for now,” hinting at potential future reassessment. These remarks fueled speculation but did not result in a formal policy change.
- **Academic and Strategic Discourse**: Analysts like Bharat Karnad and retired military officials have advocated for abandoning NFU to adopt a more flexible posture, arguing it would strengthen deterrence against Pakistan’s low-threshold nuclear threats. However, the government has not officially altered NFU.

2. **Response to Tactical Nuclear Weapons**:
- Pakistan’s deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in the 2010s prompted discussions within India about whether massive retaliation was credible against limited nuclear strikes. Some strategists suggested a shift to “proportionate response” or “flexible retaliation” to maintain deterrence without escalating to all-out nuclear war. However, the official doctrine retains the massive retaliation clause, emphasizing its deterrent value.

3. **Technological Advancements**:
- India’s development of advanced delivery systems, such as the Agni-V intercontinental ballistic missile (tested in 2012) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (e.g., INS Arihant, operationalized in 2016), enhanced the credibility of its second-strike capability. These advancements aligned with the CMD principle but raised questions about the size of India’s arsenal, with some arguing for a larger force to deter China.
- The development of ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems, like the Prithvi Air Defence and Advanced Air Defence systems, introduced debates about whether BMD could undermine CMD by encouraging a larger arsenal or preemptive strategies. No doctrinal changes have explicitly incorporated BMD.

4. **Strategic Context and China**:
- The 2003 doctrine was primarily focused on Pakistan, but India’s growing rivalry with China, particularly after the 2020 Galwan Valley clash, has shifted attention to deterring China. The Agni-V and plans for multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) reflect efforts to bolster deterrence against China’s larger nuclear arsenal. Some analysts argue that CMD may need recalibration to address a two-front threat (Pakistan and China), but no formal doctrinal shift has occurred.

5. **Political and Strategic Ambiguity**:
- India has maintained strategic ambiguity in some aspects of its doctrine, particularly regarding the size of its arsenal and specific retaliation scenarios. While the 2003 doctrine clarified massive retaliation, it avoided detailing thresholds or operational plans, preserving flexibility.
- In 2018, India’s ratification of the Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its continued engagement with the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) reinforced its image as a responsible nuclear power, aligning with the doctrine’s emphasis on restraint.

### Current Status (as of May 21, 2025)
As of the current date, India’s nuclear doctrine remains anchored in the 2003 CCS statement, with NFU, CMD, and massive retaliation as its core tenets. No official revisions have been announced, despite debates and occasional statements suggesting flexibility. The doctrine’s evolution has been shaped more by technological advancements and strategic responses to Pakistan and China than by formal policy changes. India’s nuclear arsenal, estimated at 160–170 warheads (based on 2023–2024 estimates from non-proliferation sources like SIPRI), continues to grow modestly, consistent with CMD.

### Sources
- **Draft Nuclear Doctrine (1999)**: Released by the National Security Advisory Board, August 17, 1999, published on the Ministry of External Affairs website and Pugwash Conferences archives.
- **CCS Press Release (2003)**: Ministry of External Affairs, “The Cabinet Committee on Security Reviews Operationalization of India’s Nuclear Doctrine,” January 4, 2003.
- **Strategic Analyses**: Reports from think tanks like the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) and articles in journals such as *Strategic Analysis* discussing NFU debates and technological impacts.
- **Public Statements**: Remarks by Manohar Parrikar (2016) and Rajnath Singh (2019), reported in Indian media outlets like *The Hindu* and *The Times of India*.
- **Non-Proliferation Sources**: SIPRI Yearbooks and Federation of American Scientists (FAS) reports on India’s nuclear arsenal and doctrine debates.
 
Tom Cooper was astonished by this display of poor judgment by India. Striking terrorist installations in Pakistan without first conducting SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses) shows a serious lack of strategic sense. This is not the time to try and be clever—just follow standard military protocol, as armed forces around the world do: neutralize enemy air defenses first, then proceed to target terrorist infrastructure.
Step १)
Allow armed conflict escalation ladder to be determined by civillians .
Step २) it is unsuccessfull
Step ३ ) profit?
 
Post in thread 'Pahalgam Islamic Terror Attack'

.a new normal has been set, pak military (paf) bases , pak (punjabi heartland) terrorist infrastructure will be hit in case of Pakistan terror attack in Kashmir

.it's upto pak military/pak civilian gov/pak ngo's to test the resolve and further escalation
 
I accept losses are part of combat. I am not under any illusion like the subhumans across the border that they have not lost any anything. What I was screaming on top of my lungs right from the day the terror attack happened was, this time there won't be any element of surprise. So we got to bide our time and then retaliate. I specifically even said even though many disagreed strongly here, that we must strike them at the onset of winter. That will give us enough time to prepare and improvise and most importantly make sure Chinese are kept away from the conflict while we can engage the Pakis in a long duration conflict.

Okay, we wanted revenge immediately. Apparently, Modi and his ilk didn't want to waste time and hit them sooner after 15 days. You attacked them without an element of surprise. Now, why the fuck did you give orders to them not to do SEAD and DEAD before striking them? I want to take a giant swing at that haramkore who suggested we should not hit their military assets. I am sick and fed up of our supreme leader who still after 10 years has not understood Paki military and terrorists are part of the same coin. What the fuck he is smoking? I literally said in this very forum, whether you attack only their terror infrastructure or you hit their military assets or both, the Porki retaliation will only be targeting our military assets.

There is only one way to redeem from this fiasco, let our supreme leader order a preemptive strike on their terror infrastructure which anyway will come up in few months and also their military assets in few months time. Tell all the branches of military now, winter is coming and ask them to prepare for a massive strike against Pork land in few months time.
There would be no element of surprise even if we struck in winter. If anything, Porks would be more than aware that this part of the year would be when they'd be at their most vulnerable and hence would remain mobilized. No Chinese intervention arrived in the short course of the conflict but by the time of winter (at least to my knowledge, if you have a source saying otherwise please do share), they could've made emergency acquisitions from not just the Chinese but also some westerners.

I theorize that there were 2 plans (my speculation). One devised by the babus who wanted a repeat of that Iran-Israel fiasco a few months ago where Iran launched some rockets but after having informed the Israelis in advance via backchannels. This is why Jaishankar probably informed them. If they let us bomb these targets and some token shelling was all Porks had to answer, the matter would've died down there. This is why we did not do any SEAD, by assuming Porks wanted de-escalation too. Naturally, it was too idealistic and losses were to be expected.

Another plan was probably devised by the armed forces to actually target Pork assets in the event Porks do retaliate. You cannot convince me that the SEAD/DEAD operation on May 8th and then the precision missile strikes on May 10th was improvised at the last moment. This required a ton of information gathering, coordination between Army and Air Force and about weeks of planning for it to have gone so seamlessly as it did.
 
Arre he knows.
This is for Gora sahib govts, ref my below post



Too much concern of this govt is accorded to "Gore sahib kya kahenge karenge if we are seen as bad boys?"
Sarkar lives in the shadow of upset gora sahib govts applying sanctions and embargoes, whether declared or not.

Accordingly Gora Sahibs take advantage of these sarkari behaviors, like al-Baakistan used to take advantage of previous Govt's over muh nukes wagera

Ji likely won't tie their hands ever again - the IAFwallahs will be allowed to perform SEAD/DEAD ops in advance the next time and hence, his decalartion of war on the 'sponsors of terrorists'.

And it should have been done back in 2019. And they could have responded militarily after the Rajourie bus attack instead of delaying it till the next big attack.
 
I have to say this way of talking to the press brings down armed forces’ credibility further. We are better off disclosing the numbers now, if we have it. I also don’t understand why we lose aircraft at standoff range. Plus why isn't the IAF chief the one making all these reports? We do a lot of things with bad logic. So if we made mistakes, then we learnt nothing from Balakot? Even peacetime losses of IAF are quite high. The other idiotic thing to say is Indian Navy will lead the war next time. This is going to get mocked at. This would be taken as IAF did not do its job as expected, once again. With the IAF chief talking about Tejas delays, I think our air force is all over the map. And, if we had air domination, questions like why did we not take out PAF air assets is still out there? Now I am thinking that the foreign trips for MPs were a bribe to keep them quiet. If we did lose Rafale, that would have consequences for IAF. Because Modi did say last time that the war would have been different if Rafales were around. Now we are saying if we only had Indian Navy take the lead.
I was just defending IAF with some Amreeki saying they had learnt from past mistakes. They are probably laughing at me right now. Disappointed, very disappointed.
Indian Air Force clearly learned from the shortcomings of the Balakot airstrikes, where there was insufficient evidence to confirm their success. In contrast, Operation Sindoor has produced overwhelming proof—satellite images, videos, and even confirmations coming from Pakistani sources themselves.
 
Gloomberg would never interview a 4 star yankee general about fighter losses to the Houthis. Giving a 1 on 1 interview to these clowns is the first mistake.

Babus in the gormint failed to realize this is a setup from the very beginning.

Anyway, He should've atleast said something about Paki jet losses, instead he launched into 'how we learnt from our mistakes yada yada'. Atleast say we crashed 3 or more Paki jets in return, kon verify karega. Standard good boy syndrome.
No Indian jets are crashed, he said they were taken down from the formation and changed the tactics. Relaunched them in the next battle.
 
i am waiting that in how many hours will RaGa come with a full blown press conference

this type of immaturity is never expected from a 4* general, either age has effected him, you can clearly see his reply, its not the jets down, its how they were down
you mean to say porks didnt down it, it was again a friendly fire? why to say such things

just say confidently that - No we didnt lose any jets, but we destroyed their siiting ducks in hangar

either sack the babu who decided to use this type of reply or sack him

Errm, because we DID lose jets due to some tactical errors and have taken steps to address those errors.

Are people here unable to read english?

He doesn't specify how many we list, but it's clear from his words that we definitely have some losses.

Blind denial is not healthy.

We lost some airframes, big deal. We understand why we lost them and it won't happen next time..
 
We conduct sead , we lose narrative
We don't , we lose jets
It's a catch 22, I would rather lose the narrative war, than losing jets ( not a big deal, i know but it is being made as such ).
We wouldn't have been able to say we struck only terrorist targets and international opinion would have been decisively against us. This was a deliberate, calculated act with risk factored in. Mistakes in management happen but with the PM now saying that no distinction between terrorists and their backers will be made, we have a clearer scenario for the next time.
 
We wouldn't have been able to say we struck only terrorist targets and international opinion would have been decisively against us. This was a deliberate, calculated act with risk factored in. Mistakes in management happen but with the PM now saying that no distinction between terrorists and their backers will be made, we have a clearer scenario for the next time.
Bhai karna pada na baad me !
Karna pada ki nai ?
International opinion was never decisively for us, nor it will ever be .
International opinion ke chakkar me , gormint ne fauj ke haath baandh diye .
 
Wow! I just cannot believe the level of diatribe and vitriol aimed at CDS Anil Chauhan I am seeing here. First of, CDS Anil Chauhan HAS SAID NOTHING that contradicts the previous statement on the IAF asset loss given by Air Marshall A. K. Bharti in the DGMO press conference. What exactly is the difference between "We are in a combat scenario and losses are part of combat." to CDS's "I think what’s important is not the jet being downed, but why they were downed,"? Basically, two of them stated the same thing (we lost air assets) with a little different wording. When asked about PAF claim of downing 6 Indian jets, CDS Anil Chauhan out rightly said its incorrect.

I am not only surprised by the reaction of the defense handles on X (Twitter) but also the reaction of some of the most senior and knowledgeable members.

So guys just calm down. Winning the narrative war is for the losers. We know what objectives were achieved and how we successfully pulverized the Pakistani military assets and reduced them to just doing a completely ineffectual, failed "Baniyan ul chaddi" operation.
 
Bhai karna pada na baad me !
Karna pada ki nai ?
International opinion was never decisively for us, nor it will ever be .
International opinion ke chakkar me , gormint ne fauj ke haath baandh diye .

It was for plausible deniability, so gooras don't get an excuse to paint India as an aggressor and put sanctions or embargoes.

Anyway this is the Govt thinking, it may or may not end up being the reality, for all you know we could have done some gigachad SEAD/DEAD and them bombed the piglets and no sanctions or embargoes would have happened at all :bplease:
 
C'mon man we know why.

We couldn't do SEAD/DEAD because that was 2 steps above the escalation ladder as the initial targets would have been military(SAMs).

The 1st target had to be terrorist bases, and only after could we pwn their interceptors.
I can only guess but I doubt the initial strike group were operating on offensive counter air roles or had many, if any fighters in swing role(fighters carrying both air to ground munitions and air to air munitions). A good chunk of them were A2G role probably.

Of course we changed the Rules of Engagement now, and the next attack would mean SEAD/DEAD missions first.
Funny how pakis don't seem to direct anger at this change at all.
If they actually had the courage, they would have let the skirmish continue until they got the concessions on IWT and the 'war for terror' RoE change that Modi forced, rather than ask for the ceasefire.
If avoiding SEAD is necessary to place the onus of escalation on Pakistan, then India must urgently procure stealth fighter jets and drones. That is the only effective way to evade Pakistani air defenses under such a strategy.
 
How does this narrative align with the viewpoint here that we can hit Pak from deep within our airspace and don't need stealth at all?

If we could hit them without taking risks, how were they able to inflict losses on us?

I am far from an expert so asking for opinions from people who understand these things better.

Do they outrange us in terms of BVR missiles? Can their air defences hit us even if we are operating relatively deep within our air space?

This is based on my understanding that we can hit Pak with standoff missiles without going anywhere near their airspace.
 
LOL most of the engineers lack any romantic engagements throughout their college lives, hence at a first instance a fair girl says something nice, they straight away fall in love and start family planning with immediate effect. This is a fact (and please don't deny it, I know it for a fact) and it's the very reason most of the engineers are really dumb while dealing with the opposite sex!

Once honey trapped by ISI agents, they are too scared to reveal what dumb@$$ they are and get deeper into this shyt, start taking money, they just go deeper and deeper. The only solution is zero privacy for anyone working for the defence be it permanent or contractual.
The problem is that this subject isn't spoken at the time of orientation. Everyone working in sensitive areas must be told that if a girl is interested in you on social media, it's not because you are suddenly more attractive than what the mirror suggests.
 
Nah that could have been done in some other way why does cds giving interview to foreign press, never in first place understood his role
First understand he is in singapore for Shangri la dialogue and representing the tri services as their chief "one among equals" can be kept aside for now , he was very well aware the entire foreign press will be waiting for him to answer what his country did 3 weeks ago . Its not as if Op sin happened 3 years ago and suddenly everyone is asking questions , two big military powers, countries which hold nuclear weapons went on launching CM and BM on each other Hitting Air fields and hangars and you expect no one would be not interested to hear it from the CDS what we did ..

Also remember Shangri La is Defence Summit for Asia pacific nations, and guess the Chinese defence Minister has cancelled his plan to participate this year ..

So every one wants to hear it from Big military power in Asia ,, At least in Manpower numbers after china we are the biggest military in Asia ..
 
VPN-HSL-468-X60-2x

Latest Replies

Featured Content

Trending Threads

Back
Top