AMCA - Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft

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To some random internet defence nerd accusing me for iranian dalal lol..when u lack technical acumen than u resort to name calling nd it reflects in the level of intellect.

truth hurts 💔 reality bites.. that's why crying nd squealing.

Leave iran.. i hv also shared in details about the capabilities of Russian IADS where earlier poster had stupidly claimed that only we posses some invisible "nervous system" like IACCS nd RUSSIA who has been developing IADS nd associated tech since ages lacks such capabilities.. lol no counter to that? now what russian dalal..

Lol.. looks like again i shattered some juvenile hyper nationalist dreamworld scenario.. where everything india has is superior nd unheard of.

Again i repeat enjoy the current success but there are substantial threats waiting in future.. being Nationalistic isn't a crime but deforming nationalism foolishly with overconfident tall claims lacking any sense of reality is certainly stupidity of grandeur level.
You don't have any technical acumen. You are just a noob who doesn't even know the basics of tech.
That's why you are idiot enough to think that a s400 operator will get f35.

Speaking of which, you ran away from showing us which link of yours shows a 5th generation combat profile as your cut paste showed.
Your lack of analytic skills shows you lack technical skills and is just a dude pretending to talk about shit he doesn't understand
 
In the humble opinion of this random defence nerd — who probably knows a thing or two about network topologies and C4I systems, though surely not as much as some of the strategic luminaries here — let me offer a small clarification on what I’ve been saying all along.

First, I never said stealth doesn’t matter or that India doesn’t need a 5th-gen fleet. I simply pushed back on the idea that stealth platforms like the J-35 are some silver bullet that would suddenly collapse the Indian IADS. That idea ignores the reality of how air defence ecosystems actually work.

What I did say was that the decisive factor in Operation Sindoor wasn’t the S-400 battery. It was the IACCS — the command-and-control nervous system that connected all the pieces together. Without that, the best radar or missile is just another emitter waiting to get hunted.

Now, let’s talk systems.

The Iranian system — whatever one wants to call it (Fakour C2, Rasool, Khatam al-Anbiya etc.) — is a relatively new effort at integrating a patchwork of legacy and indigenous systems. It’s best described as a star topology, where all sensor data is routed to a central node. There is no public evidence of automatic shooter assignment, lateral node communication, or collaborative targeting across sectors. So when F-35s penetrated Iranian airspace, they didn’t defeat a fused IADS — they walked through stovepipes.

The Russian system is more mature, but its architecture is fundamentally hierarchical — not distributed. The control flow moves from battalion to brigade to theatre to national level. This is reflected both in doctrine and in the underlying MTSS (Multiservice Transport Communication System) network, which is organized in rings and subrings, using X.25-style circuit switching — a stark contrast to India’s IP/MPLS-based AFNET. That matters because IP/MPLS supports dynamic rerouting and mesh-like survivability, while MTSS is inherently less flexible.

Within this tree-structured system, Russia uses systems like Polyana-D4M1 at the brigade level, and Universal-1E at higher echelons. However, there is no conclusive open-source evidence of routine cross-brigade collaborative fire assignments, even though in theory, Universal-1E supports broader coordination. In practice, collaborative targeting appears limited primarily to within the brigade’s command span. If a brigade node is destroyed or jammed, battalion-level fire units may lose upstream command unless manually re-tasked — which is not exactly resilience.

India’s IACCS, by contrast, is built on AFNET, an MPLS-encrypted IP backbone that allows any node to talk to any other, regardless of hierarchical position. That’s not just buzzwords — it enables cross-sector shooter assignment, low-latency cueing (1–2 seconds for high-priority targets), and redundancy. So yes — Ashwini can cold-cue an S-400, Rajendra can act as FCR for another platform, and even a Flycatcher can feed into the network. That’s a kill web, not a kill chain.

So I reiterate what I originally said: the hero of Operation Sindoor was not the radar or the missile — it was the invisible architecture that tied them together. IACCS was the secret sauce — not because it’s magical, but because it’s resilient, modular, and built for the threat environment we face. That’s not overconfidence. That’s engineering.

Now, on to the next strawman: that Russian IADS failures were just tactical lapses — site concealment, scoot delays, or poor camouflage — and not architectural. That assumes that tactical errors happen in a vacuum.

But let’s unpack that. Why are Russian SAM batteries failing to scoot fast enough? Why are they exposed long enough to be hit by ATACMS or Neptune strikes? The answer isn’t just poor drills — it’s a consequence of how their C4I architecture works.

In a hierarchical system, each brigade command is a node in a tree. Kill assignments and retreat cues flow down from brigade HQ to battalion-level units. If the brigade node is jammed, blinded, or destroyed — as has happened in multiple documented cases — the battalions lose orchestration. They cannot coordinate egress, reassign shooters, or share threat data horizontally. So when one brigade is isolated, you can saturate and collapse it. That is not a tactical failure. That’s a systemic one.

Compare that with IACCS. Even if a node is taken out — whether it’s a sub-sector command post or a comms relay — rerouting is automatic. Fire control and cueing can be reassigned laterally across sectors. Redundancy is baked in. That’s the definition of resilience. You can scoot not because your SOP says so, but because your network tells you it’s time.

Again I am not saying our system is some magical wand that has 100% kill rate, instead I am saying ours is more flexible in its architecture and hence better.

Now, let’s address the ominous specter of Chinese ISR and the supposedly unstoppable J-35.

In the humble opinion of this random defence nerd — who may not have attained the cosmic enlightenment required to equate “stealth + satellite = air defence collapse,” but has read a few radar papers — let me explain why this argument doesn’t hold up.

Stealth is not invisibility. ISR is not omniscience. That’s precisely why India has spent the last decade building a distributed, multi-band sensor architecture — integrating VHF and L-band long-range search radars for early detection of low-RCS targets, and X-band fire-control radars like Rajendra or Flycatcher for terminal engagement. These radars are not meant to compete with stealth; they’re meant to outmaneuver it through cue-based activation and time-sharing. Ashwini may spot the ghost, but S-400 does the haunting.

Now, some claim that Chinese ISR satellites will hand Pakistan the holy grail of real-time targeting. Yet we just saw this play out. During Operation Sindoor, Chinese ISR — reportedly involving Yaogan and Gaofen constellations — supported Pakistani planning. Result? Not a single S-400, MR-SAM, or other high-value AD asset was hit. Either the ISR wasn’t timely, or their C4I couldn’t exploit it fast enough. And remember: the few vector attacks that were attempted failed — either because the target had moved, or the interceptor reached it first.

That’s the point: ISR gives you data. Exploiting that data in time — before the launcher displaces or before your munitions get intercepted — is the real challenge. That’s where India’s kill web outclasses theirs.

And even if that J-35 shows up, it’s not flying through a vacuum. It still has to approach the Indian airspace. It still has to launch PGMs. And those PGMs — whether ALBMs or cruise missiles — are not stealthy. They can be intercepted. Our low-level X-band radars will be forward-deployed, silent, and waiting. The entire point of distributed IADS is that no single missile or plane brings it down — the system adapts.

As for ISR satellites — there’s an answer for that too. India has already begun fielding satellite jammers and passive deception systems. Infrared decoys. Radar reflectors. Multi-spectral camouflage. Not to mention we know satellite pass timings to the second. If it becomes necessary, docking and denial systems — like co-orbital counterspace assets — are being quietly explored too. You jam what you can, spoof what you can’t, and move before they can kill. If anything it’s a call to invest in more counter satellite and our own space based capabilities.

Look, no IADS is 100% foolproof — not ours, not Russia’s, not anyone’s. Every defensive architecture has vulnerabilities, especially against a thinking adversary. But to leap from that truth to the idea that a J-35 will suddenly waltz through Indian airspace and vaporize our defences unchecked — and that our only viable counter is a panic-bought F-35 fleet we can’t afford, can’t integrate, and can’t support operationally — is a stretch I’m not willing to make.

And I have said this repeatedly, and I’ll say it again: as of today, there is no fifth-generation fighter on the market that fits our operational, financial, and integration requirements. If such a platform emerges — one we can afford, maintain, and plug into our C4I infrastructure without disrupting the ecosystem — we’ll buy it. Until then, we work with what we have and double down on the invisible advantages we’ve already built.

Ur response is riddled with erroneous claims again as without any comprehension of the russian equivalent structure.

Oki let's break it down for u.. Russia do have mesh like redundancy.. Russian C4ISR network does include redundancy measures via HF/VHF/UHF, microwave nd satellite links which are designed to survive NATO-style EW attacks..
Mesh or hybrid networks are currently in use.. particularly at strategic and operational levels. Russia has also made considerable investment in software-defined radios (SDRs) (e.g Azart family R-187-P1) that enable adaptive routing, mesh networking, and direct unit-to-unit communication, bypassing traditional hierarchies.. so ur claim is again erroneous.. as the capability exists.

On Russian X.25-based circuit switching used in MTSS provides dedicated point-to-point connections.. those are less susceptible to network congestion or packet-based attacks (IP spoofing or DDoS) nd that is critical for real-time C2 in air defense or artillery coordination where guaranteed delivery of commands is pertinent.
Also about MTSS again u are uninformed as russia way back in 2010 updated it nd included IP-based overlays, fiber-optic trunk lines, and satellite augmentation (Gonets-D1, Raduga)..The Unified Tactical Command and Control System (YeSU TZ) integrates elements of packet-switched routing is similar to MPLS.. so again it's an erroneous claim. U claimed russia lacks cross brigade collaborative fire missions.. again it's wrong.. i had already provided u a structure of Russian Universal-1E, Baykal-1ME and Ranzhir-M1 systems that are designed for cross-brigade coordination. Which u didn't even read.
Collaborative targeting at theatre level has been demonstrated in various exercises like Zapad..Tsentr nd Kavkaz so russia does have the CBCFM.The Universal-1E system are deployed at higher echelons nd is designed to integrate data from multiple brigades and coordinate fire assignments across a theatre.. while Polyana-D4M1 is used at the brigade level nd integrates air defense assets like S-300 or Buk systems enabling coordinated engagements within and potentially beyond the brigade..


Again u claimed If brigade node is destroyed, battalions lose command unless manually retasked.. wrong again
Russian systems include failover mechanisms such as mobile command posts Kapustnik-B, Ranzhir, Barnaul-T that can assume command roles temporarily..even ASUs include protocols for autnomous engagement criteria..allowing semi-independent battalion ops..Russian SAM systems (like Tor-M2, Buk-M3) can operate in standalone mode and retask based on local radar or uplinked cues..

On indian MPLS..The “kill web” concept entirely relies on continuous network availability which u completely ignored as in a high-intensity conflict..EW attacks targeting AFNET’s IP infrastructure could disrupt the low-latency cueing (1–2 seconds) especially if adversaries (read xina) exploit vulnerabilities in IP/MPLS routing protocols or target network nodes with kinetics or electronic attacks..

So nothing is full proof no IADS evn MPLS based IACCS which u were vouching for.. the "research paper" which u hv claimed to read isnt of some highest quality it seems..while u can suggest me some let me also dwell into what u hv read.. nd this isn't a dig I'm seriously interested in those "research papers".

Now coming to ur claims for india vs pakistan nd russian S400 loses which are pretty much laughable nd i can only deplore at the level of reasoning given.. because even a layman can comprehend the inherited disadvantage of any long range semi mobile IADS which isn't unique to S400 specially in Indo Pak scenario where distance nd range is quite less for a semi mobile IADS to ward off just by relocating as the time for relocation isn't just there any projectile traveling at speed of mach 2-3 (common for ALBMS like Rudram 2 which has flight time of 300s for 300Km, paxtan has CM400AKG In limited no but will increase going in future) can cover a distance of few hundred km under 5 min..while S400 being semi mobile takes exactly 5-10 min to move nd relocate.. IAF also operates 91N6E on mast to detect low flying cruise missile but that again limits mobilty when attacked..

Also I had already provided the counter to the same on my previous post but let me rephrase again india S400 nd MRSAM survived not because of IACCS or IADS only but because paxtan lacks horribly in offensive capabilities (read PGMs nd ALBMs) it fired only 2 CM400 akg at S400 but it fell much before probably due to the reason as it was launched much before the effective range of the missiles..

Nd before u (some random defence nerd) scorn the value of S400 in operation sindoor there are far more credible voices which punctures ur narratives about how the mere presence of S400 nd not IACCS meant the difference.. IACCS is enabler a force multiplier however without Hardware ( read S400) it won't make any difference lol.


View: https://youtu.be/W5FYzO0RaFY

Watch from 15:10 PAF was vary of S400 nd it disturbed the entire ORBAT of PAF during the whole conflict.. so there's no replacement for hardware against a complimentary but essential software



In the humble opinion of this same random defence nerd — who admittedly might have skimmed a few boring white papers on C4I topology instead of just watching Zapad highlight reels — I’d like to gently point out a few misconceptions that seem to be running rampant in your reply.

First, let’s clear the fog around topologies.

Yes, the Russian MTSS network includes HF/VHF/UHF, satellite, and microwave links. And yes, these offer redundancy — physical redundancy. That’s not the same as logical networking architecture. A ring of radios and satellites can give you communication fallback, but if your fire control and kill assignment are still routed vertically through a hierarchical tree, you are not doing mesh-based collaborative targeting. You’re just doing star topology with extra insurance.

Second, the X.25 defense.

Saying X.25-style switching is superior because it guarantees delivery and avoids IP spoofing is like arguing that telegraphs are better than smartphones because they don’t get malware. The problem is latency and rigidity — circuit switching allocates static paths, which is fine for cold war artillery drills, but terrible for 1–2 second shooter cueing across sectors. That’s why India dumped such systems and built IACCS on IP/MPLS — which, when implemented over hardened military MPLS trunks, is designed to withstand precisely the kind of electronic disruption you’re worried about.

Also, spoofing and DDoS are non-issues in MPLS-encrypted military backbones like AFNET. You’re confusing open internet vulnerabilities with closed military routing protocols.

Third, overlays ≠ native architecture.

Yes, YeSU-TZ includes IP overlays. But let’s be clear: overlays on a fundamentally hierarchical system don’t magically create lateral autonomy. They extend data bandwidth. That’s not the same as automatic shooter reassignment across sectors if a brigade node goes down. India’s IACCS was designed from the ground up to support mesh survivability and autonomous node operation. You haven’t shown that Universal-1E, Polyana-D4M1, or Baykal-1ME enable dynamic, unscripted cross-brigade fire control reallocation in real time under combat conditions.

Fourth, failover ≠ lateral targeting.

Yes, Russia has mobile CPs like Kapustnik-B or Ranzhir-M. But these are designed for temporary control restoration, not real-time lateral collaborative fire. Autonomous battalion ops? Sure — limited to local radar and pre-authorized engagement zones. That’s not a kill web — that’s doctrinal contingency, not mesh command.

Fifth, about AFNET’s “fragility”.

This one made me smile. If you truly believe India’s IP/MPLS-based IACCS is somehow more vulnerable than a tree-based MTSS with known upstream dependency bottlenecks, I’d encourage you to dig deeper into MPLS rerouting, QoS tagging, and encrypted routing domains. The entire point of AFNET’s architecture is that if one command post is jammed or destroyed, others can automatically reroute control and targeting data. This isn’t theory — it’s operational reality, tested in both peacetime exercises and live-response situations.

And by the way, who exactly said the S-400 wasn’t useful? Certainly not me. My argument — consistently — has been that the S-400 performs exceptionally well within our architecture. It is deadly because it’s plugged into IACCS, not despite it. If the Pakistanis had gotten their hands on an S-400 battery without the kind of resilient, real-time C4I network we’ve built, we would’ve smoked it just like we’ve degraded every other siloed air defense system out there. That’s the whole point. The secret sauce isn’t just the radar or the missile — it’s the nervous system that connects them. So maybe — just maybe — it’s time we started taking pride in something we’ve actually built right, instead of assuming value only comes from imported hardware.

Also can you even carry a CM400 in a J-35s internal weapons bay? How does that matter? Akash NG by the way is designed specifically to protect against air launched ballistic missiles.

In summary, having multiple radios, SDRs, or even satellite links doesn’t magically grant you a mesh command logic. That’s like saying having a power strip gives you a smart grid. The core distinction is between redundant transmission and distributed decision-making.

Happy to share sources — assuming, of course, we can agree on what topology actually means.

Both you guys have good knowledge. Are you tech students or professionals into networking?
Perhaps we can open a thread on networking, security, cyber war.
 
May b when it can carry payload outside of Internal Weapon bay, internally hardly carries 4 long range BVR may be same num of Rudrams not sure though

rudram 1 will fit, its in astra mk1 dimension ig

Officially AMCA IWB is 4.2m long, 2.2m wide, 0.75m deep.
None of us have time & patience to read 100s of pages but we can quickly scan for useful pics, diagrams, graphs, tables, etc.
You can check some scaled diagrams i made editing artists' CADs in 2D to depict certain type of weapons:
CAUTION - don't panic:scared2::nono:

















 
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