I need to express some serious concerns about the current state of the Navy’s vessel strategy, particularly when it comes to classes like the Nilgiri and Vishakapatnam. While we often hear high praise for the Navy, it seems to me that their strategy is lacking in several crucial areas. The SSBN program and ASWSWC are commendable, but other aspects appear to be misaligned with effective naval strategy.
Take the Nilgiri Class, for instance. Are they being built solely to meet a numerical target by 2030, without considering their actual role and effectiveness in modern naval warfare? This approach seems to lack strategic foresight of what each kind of class constitutes in broader strategy.
When evaluating the role of these ships in Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW) and Land Attack scenarios, it becomes clear that their design may not be the most efficient. Globally, navies are moving away from building small to medium-sized frigates (<7000 tons) for these roles. The cost-effectiveness of using fighter jets, surface-launched missiles, or aircraft carriers for strikes is much higher. If the intent is for these ships to engage offensively beyond our territorial waters, the number of just eight missiles is insufficient. On the defensive side, using fighter jets armed with BrahMos missiles would be more effective against incoming ships from the PLAN.
For Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), the Nilgiri Class seems to be an overkill in several aspects. The inclusion of a 4-panel AESA radar and L-band early warning radar appears excessive. A 2-panel rotating radar would suffice for ASW operations. Similarly, the choice of Barak-8 missiles seems excessive; more cost-effective options like ESSM or VL-SRSAM would be adequate. Additionally, the lack of ASROC-type missiles in favor of torpedoes alone seems to be a missed opportunity. The single helicopter hangar, rather than two, severely limits the availability of ASW helicopters for missions. The absence of electric motors, which are present in other advanced frigates like the FREMM or Type 26, is another significant shortcoming.
In terms of Anti-Air Warfare (AAW), while the radars are indeed top-notch, the deployment of only 32 Barak-8 missiles raises questions. This setup lacks a high-low mix, which is critical for effective AAW. The combination of two expensive radars with a limited number of missiles suggests a mismatch in capability and expenditure.
The design appears to be an attempt at a general-purpose frigate, but this approach does not justify the inclusion of an early warning radar, especially when the ship lacks a long-range surface-to-air missile (LRSAM) system. At a cost of approximately 1 billion dollars, the vessel seems to be a half-assed jack-of-all-trades but master of none. It falls short of effectively fulfilling any of the roles it is supposed to cover.
You aren't gonna send this 1 Billion ship to fight Asymmetric Warfare, Secure Shipping Lines, Anti-Piracy right?
Overall, the Nilgiri Class represents a costly and inefficient solution that does not seem to address the broader needs of our naval strategy effectively. It appears to be a poorly executed attempt to cover multiple roles without excelling in any.
I really like Navy to answer themselves? What do they intend to achieve with this half-assed ships?
Personally I think we need
1. ASWSWC(For Inshore ASW Duties)
2. 6000 Ton ASW Frigate for both Carrier Escort Roles and Filtering out waters in far away from Coast
3. A General Purpose Tier-2 Frigate for all Generic Duties such as Anti-Piracy, Maritime Security.. Second tier duties.
4. 12,000 Ton Multi Role Destroyer.
Navy got 2 things right, the ASWSWC and NGD while the Nilgiri and Vishakapatnam excel at none- neither AAW nor ASW.