Indian Special Forces

username unkown said:
I agree combat experience is very important thing I believe sf shouldn't be used without proper intelligence and in every encounter use few sf in small teams but use ghatak troops and common infantry as main force
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SF shouldnt be used in such petty ops.

Look 3 are injured today…theres a high price value on their training.
 
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Alby said:
Bro everyone had said this atleast a million times about this,but that has to be more of a govt policy rather than military’s.If only govt is willing to send the boys across the border as military advisers or to sabotage some tactical or strategic targets the establishment will always send the boys for CT ops only.How else you think these boys will get combay experience if they are reserved for only the true SF ops west does which won’t happen in Indian context in near future .
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Jedi Operator said:
I think that was Tim Kennedy on Jocko Podcast, anyways, if we are to discuss employbility of SOF personnel. Let me bring to your attention how McCrystal changed JSOC
From Ch-18 of Relentless Strike

"That direction was away from the large set-piece operations that for so long had dominated JSOC’s thinking. Instead, McChrystal wanted to expand the capability to operate on the left side of a spectrum that had large-scale joint readiness exercise-style operations at the right end, and small, completely clandestine missions on the other.

“He wanted to go blacker, faster, smaller,” said a source familiar with the meeting. McChrystal expressed preferences for smaller tailored packages for such missions and for a Joint Readiness Training paradigm, in which JSOC elements trained together on specific tasks, but without the massive joint readiness exercise umbrella."

"To help accelerate the process, he made the entire JOC facility a sensitive compartmented information facility, or SCIF (pronounced “skiff”), so folks from different agencies and task forces could share top secret data quickly and openly—a complete reversal from the mind-set that traditionally dominated special ops and intelligence organizations."

"Perhaps no individual other than McChrystal himself was more responsible for turning JSOC into an information age war-fighting machine over the next couple of years than Colonel Mike Flynn............“The NSA did not want to have the aircraft in Iraq,” said the officer. “They wanted to do other things [with them].”17 Opposition to the reorientation of Orange also came from high inside the special operations world. “That organization wasn’t designed to do tactical intelligence for JSOC—they pirated it,” said a retired special operations officer. “This was supposed to be a strategic asset that was doing serious stuff.”

So JSOC started having minor capabilities of NSA, CIA and other agencies so as to not be depended on them for tactical intellegence.

Now @Yodha you tell me how far are we from having all this ? No details need to be shared just a general perspective, that would help
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No. That was Shawn Ryans podcast. I believe the guest was from USAF 24STS. That's not important in anyway.

We are far far away from any of what you have mentioned.
 
Yodha said:
No. That was Shawn Ryans podcast. I believe the guest was from USAF 24STS. That's not important in anyway.

We are far far away from any of what you have mentioned.
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in war things happen fast, changes happen quicker and bureaucratic grip is lose, it took US half a decade to get this started then, with the kind of budget they had. India ko toh 20 sal lag jayenge agar aj bhi start kiya toh.

Why the hell are we not taking this seriously. We eat our own...whatever happened with Col Bakshi, SS Shekhawat, Pavithran Rajan...we only ever learn when we get our asses kicked. Matlab kya hi bolun. Kessa desh h ye
 
Alby said:
There is a lot of SF guys in the second pic which we had seen in years.
Is that a laser illuminator in the hand guard of Ak of the first guy in the fourth pic? Is that a flash light attached to the barrel?
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Looks like a flashlight covered with a faded UCP cover...
 
Tier 1 Patriot said:
View attachment 14832View attachment 14833View attachment 14834View attachment 14835
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Garud and Para in same frame, they were rushed cause the op was in a populated and critical area. A lot of higher ups still think that SF are supertroopers ki seedha rush kardo.
COLDHEARTED AVIATOR said:
Its boils my blood to see Para SF wearing patka and 3 have got injured.

No office
No officer
And no department

Is above criticism when it comes to a poor jawans life.
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They went on an op where one would be at a heavy disadvantage, modern gear wont be solving this issue.
 
Alby said:
There is a lot of SF guys in the second pic which we had seen in years.
Is that a laser illuminator in the hand guard of Ak of the first guy in the fourth pic? Is that a flash light attached to the barrel?
Click to expand...
No these are camou cloth covers
 
Airborne22 said:
Garud and Para in same frame, they were rushed cause the op was in a populated and critical area. A lot of higher ups still think that SF are supertroopers ki seedha rush kardo.

They went on an op where one would be at a heavy disadvantage, modern gear wont be solving this issue.
Click to expand...
They rush coz they are night blind and in most if not all incidents terrorists have escaped in night.

We need to RULE the night and thatswhy Gear matters.
 
COLDHEARTED AVIATOR said:
They rush coz they are night blind and in most if not all incidents terrorists have escaped in night.

We need to RULE the night and thatswhy Gear matters.
Click to expand...
you are mixing up the details here, 3 injured (2 fully recovered btw) was in kishtwar, they weren't rushed. The rush was in Srinagar. And jitna marzi gear le ao, the tasking is given by the higher ups and is highly political in nature, unse na ho payega !
 
Airborne22 said:
you are mixing up the details here, 3 injured (2 fully recovered btw) was in kishtwar, they weren't rushed. The rush was in Srinagar. And jitna marzi gear le ao, the tasking is given by the higher ups and is highly political in nature, unse na ho payega !
Click to expand...
Bhai unko promotion lena hota he yeh dikha k…sir yes sir op over sir in 6 hours sir.
 

The Struggling State of Indian Army’s Para SF: High Casualties and Lackluster Combat Tactics in J&K​

The Indian Army’s Para Special Forces (Para SF), once renowned for their precision, courage, and unmatched tactical expertise, have found themselves in a concerning struggle against militants, particularly in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). Recent encounters have shed light on the high casualty rates, the seeming obliviousness of the military apparatus, and a significant gap in the combat strategies being employed. Despite their elite status, the Para SF's recent performance, especially in counter-insurgency operations, has raised questions about the preparedness, strategy, and effectiveness of India’s military apparatus. The government's approach to these challenges also deserves scrutiny, as the need for reform has never been more urgent.

Recent Struggles and High Casualties​

The Para SF, responsible for executing high-risk operations, is tasked with neutralizing the most dangerous militants entrenched in difficult terrains. However, in recent encounters in J&K, particularly in Kashmir Valley, the Special Forces have faced high casualties that highlight a critical issue: the tactics and equipment being used are not always adequate to cope with the evolving nature of militant warfare.

During operations in areas such as Pulwama and Shopian, Para SF units have encountered heavy resistance, often leading to casualties. One of the most notable encounters was in the late months of 2023, when a Para SF unit suffered significant losses during a botched operation against a group of militants in a densely forested area. The militants, equipped with modern weapons, used guerrilla tactics to outmaneuver the SF soldiers, who, despite their training, were caught off guard by the insurgents' hit-and-run strategy. This incident reflected a larger issue: the changing dynamics of militant warfare in J&K, which seems to outpace the existing counter-insurgency strategies of the army.

The lack of sufficient intelligence, inadequate tactical planning, and the failure to anticipate modern guerrilla tactics have played a significant role in the high casualty figures. Special Forces, known for their precision, have been caught in prolonged firefights where rapid extraction and reinforcements were not effectively coordinated, leading to tragic losses. These events show that despite their elite status, the Para SF are being asked to execute increasingly complex operations without the necessary strategic support or situational awareness.

Obliviousness of the Military Apparatus and Government​

One of the most concerning aspects of the current state of Para SF operations is the perceived obliviousness of both the military apparatus and the government to the evolving challenges faced by these elite forces. The army's reliance on traditional counter-insurgency tactics, while effective in earlier years, seems increasingly ineffective in the face of modern militant tactics, which include advanced weapons, better coordination, and cyber-enabled strategies.

Furthermore, the government’s neglect of the soldiers’ welfare has been an ongoing issue. Despite the high casualty rates among the Para SF, there has been little in terms of tangible policy reform or an increase in support for the forces. While the army has been asked to continuously adapt to emerging threats, the political and military leadership has often been slow to recognize the need for comprehensive changes in both the strategies and the equipment provided to the forces.

In addition, the issue of inter-agency coordination has been a significant factor in the failure to execute well-coordinated operations. Intelligence-sharing between different branches of the military, paramilitary forces, and local law enforcement agencies remains fragmented, leading to inefficiencies in identifying and neutralizing militant threats.

What Should Not Be Done​

To address the issues surrounding the Para SF, it is crucial to avoid certain missteps:

  1. Avoid Over-Resourcing Single Approaches: One of the biggest pitfalls would be doubling down on the same tactics and expecting different results. Simply increasing the number of troops in the field or continuing with existing, conventional counter-insurgency tactics will only exacerbate the problem. The insurgents have adapted to these tactics, and the approach needs to evolve.
  2. Don’t Overlook Technological Integration: The military should not underestimate the role of modern technology in warfare. The insurgents in J&K are increasingly relying on drones, encrypted communication, and cyber tools. The Indian Army’s Special Forces should not be left behind in this aspect. Lack of investment in technology has cost the lives of soldiers during these operations.
  3. Avoid Politicizing Military Decisions: Any attempt to influence military strategies and operations for political gain must be avoided. The decision-making process regarding troop deployment, strategy, and reinforcements should always remain apolitical and driven by military intelligence and strategic goals, not political considerations.

What Should Be Done to Change the Outcome​

There are several actionable steps that the Indian government and military authorities should take to improve the operational efficiency and safety of Para SF units:

  1. Enhanced Intelligence Gathering and Analysis: The government must prioritize improved intelligence-gathering mechanisms, especially in real-time. The integration of AI-driven surveillance systems, better satellite imagery, and local informants is vital for tracking militant movements and preempting attacks. This intelligence must be shared seamlessly across all military and paramilitary units involved in the operation.
  2. Adopt Flexible, Adaptive Combat Tactics: The Indian Army needs to shift its focus to more flexible combat tactics. Para SF, while elite, should not be expected to tackle conventional combat situations alone. The army should embrace asymmetric warfare strategies, adapting to the guerrilla tactics used by militants. This includes creating smaller, more mobile, and rapidly deployable units to respond quickly to changing conditions on the ground.
  3. Technological Upgrades and Training: It is crucial to equip the Special Forces with the latest technologies, including night-vision equipment, drones for surveillance, and advanced communication tools that allow for quicker coordination in difficult terrains. The government should allocate funds to modernize the equipment of soldiers in the field, focusing on both offensive and defensive technologies.
  4. Improved Medical and Extraction Protocols: In situations where casualties occur, the speed of medical attention and extraction is paramount. The army must improve its medical response systems, ensuring that paramedics and helicopters are readily available in battle zones. A faster, more efficient extraction system could save the lives of soldiers who would otherwise succumb to injuries in the absence of timely medical care.
  5. Better Soldier Welfare and Support: The well-being of soldiers must be prioritized. Adequate compensation, post-operation mental health support, and rehabilitation are critical for morale. A force as elite as the Para SF needs constant motivation, and ensuring the welfare of the soldiers will help retain the best talent in the force.

Conclusion​

The Para SF’s current struggles in J&K are a stark reminder of the challenges that arise when counter-insurgency strategies remain static in an ever-changing warfare environment. High casualties and ineffective tactics can no longer be tolerated, especially when the lives of elite soldiers are at stake. Both the government and military leadership must act decisively, embracing technological advancements, improving intelligence, and adapting combat tactics to meet the evolving nature of insurgency. By fostering a more supportive and agile environment for the forces, the Indian Army can ensure that their elite units remain the formidable force they were always meant to be, capable of succeeding in the complex and perilous operations they face today.
 
mcpo117 said:

The Struggling State of Indian Army’s Para SF: High Casualties and Lackluster Combat Tactics in J&K​

The Indian Army’s Para Special Forces (Para SF), once renowned for their precision, courage, and unmatched tactical expertise, have found themselves in a concerning struggle against militants, particularly in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). Recent encounters have shed light on the high casualty rates, the seeming obliviousness of the military apparatus, and a significant gap in the combat strategies being employed. Despite their elite status, the Para SF's recent performance, especially in counter-insurgency operations, has raised questions about the preparedness, strategy, and effectiveness of India’s military apparatus. The government's approach to these challenges also deserves scrutiny, as the need for reform has never been more urgent.

Recent Struggles and High Casualties​

The Para SF, responsible for executing high-risk operations, is tasked with neutralizing the most dangerous militants entrenched in difficult terrains. However, in recent encounters in J&K, particularly in Kashmir Valley, the Special Forces have faced high casualties that highlight a critical issue: the tactics and equipment being used are not always adequate to cope with the evolving nature of militant warfare.

During operations in areas such as Pulwama and Shopian, Para SF units have encountered heavy resistance, often leading to casualties. One of the most notable encounters was in the late months of 2023, when a Para SF unit suffered significant losses during a botched operation against a group of militants in a densely forested area. The militants, equipped with modern weapons, used guerrilla tactics to outmaneuver the SF soldiers, who, despite their training, were caught off guard by the insurgents' hit-and-run strategy. This incident reflected a larger issue: the changing dynamics of militant warfare in J&K, which seems to outpace the existing counter-insurgency strategies of the army.

The lack of sufficient intelligence, inadequate tactical planning, and the failure to anticipate modern guerrilla tactics have played a significant role in the high casualty figures. Special Forces, known for their precision, have been caught in prolonged firefights where rapid extraction and reinforcements were not effectively coordinated, leading to tragic losses. These events show that despite their elite status, the Para SF are being asked to execute increasingly complex operations without the necessary strategic support or situational awareness.

Obliviousness of the Military Apparatus and Government​

One of the most concerning aspects of the current state of Para SF operations is the perceived obliviousness of both the military apparatus and the government to the evolving challenges faced by these elite forces. The army's reliance on traditional counter-insurgency tactics, while effective in earlier years, seems increasingly ineffective in the face of modern militant tactics, which include advanced weapons, better coordination, and cyber-enabled strategies.

Furthermore, the government’s neglect of the soldiers’ welfare has been an ongoing issue. Despite the high casualty rates among the Para SF, there has been little in terms of tangible policy reform or an increase in support for the forces. While the army has been asked to continuously adapt to emerging threats, the political and military leadership has often been slow to recognize the need for comprehensive changes in both the strategies and the equipment provided to the forces.

In addition, the issue of inter-agency coordination has been a significant factor in the failure to execute well-coordinated operations. Intelligence-sharing between different branches of the military, paramilitary forces, and local law enforcement agencies remains fragmented, leading to inefficiencies in identifying and neutralizing militant threats.

What Should Not Be Done​

To address the issues surrounding the Para SF, it is crucial to avoid certain missteps:

  1. Avoid Over-Resourcing Single Approaches: One of the biggest pitfalls would be doubling down on the same tactics and expecting different results. Simply increasing the number of troops in the field or continuing with existing, conventional counter-insurgency tactics will only exacerbate the problem. The insurgents have adapted to these tactics, and the approach needs to evolve.
  2. Don’t Overlook Technological Integration: The military should not underestimate the role of modern technology in warfare. The insurgents in J&K are increasingly relying on drones, encrypted communication, and cyber tools. The Indian Army’s Special Forces should not be left behind in this aspect. Lack of investment in technology has cost the lives of soldiers during these operations.
  3. Avoid Politicizing Military Decisions: Any attempt to influence military strategies and operations for political gain must be avoided. The decision-making process regarding troop deployment, strategy, and reinforcements should always remain apolitical and driven by military intelligence and strategic goals, not political considerations.

What Should Be Done to Change the Outcome​

There are several actionable steps that the Indian government and military authorities should take to improve the operational efficiency and safety of Para SF units:

  1. Enhanced Intelligence Gathering and Analysis: The government must prioritize improved intelligence-gathering mechanisms, especially in real-time. The integration of AI-driven surveillance systems, better satellite imagery, and local informants is vital for tracking militant movements and preempting attacks. This intelligence must be shared seamlessly across all military and paramilitary units involved in the operation.
  2. Adopt Flexible, Adaptive Combat Tactics: The Indian Army needs to shift its focus to more flexible combat tactics. Para SF, while elite, should not be expected to tackle conventional combat situations alone. The army should embrace asymmetric warfare strategies, adapting to the guerrilla tactics used by militants. This includes creating smaller, more mobile, and rapidly deployable units to respond quickly to changing conditions on the ground.
  3. Technological Upgrades and Training: It is crucial to equip the Special Forces with the latest technologies, including night-vision equipment, drones for surveillance, and advanced communication tools that allow for quicker coordination in difficult terrains. The government should allocate funds to modernize the equipment of soldiers in the field, focusing on both offensive and defensive technologies.
  4. Improved Medical and Extraction Protocols: In situations where casualties occur, the speed of medical attention and extraction is paramount. The army must improve its medical response systems, ensuring that paramedics and helicopters are readily available in battle zones. A faster, more efficient extraction system could save the lives of soldiers who would otherwise succumb to injuries in the absence of timely medical care.
  5. Better Soldier Welfare and Support: The well-being of soldiers must be prioritized. Adequate compensation, post-operation mental health support, and rehabilitation are critical for morale. A force as elite as the Para SF needs constant motivation, and ensuring the welfare of the soldiers will help retain the best talent in the force.

Conclusion​

The Para SF’s current struggles in J&K are a stark reminder of the challenges that arise when counter-insurgency strategies remain static in an ever-changing warfare environment. High casualties and ineffective tactics can no longer be tolerated, especially when the lives of elite soldiers are at stake. Both the government and military leadership must act decisively, embracing technological advancements, improving intelligence, and adapting combat tactics to meet the evolving nature of insurgency. By fostering a more supportive and agile environment for the forces, the Indian Army can ensure that their elite units remain the formidable force they were always meant to be, capable of succeeding in the complex and perilous operations they face today.
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abso-fucking-lutley
A good analysis I agree with everything stated here
 
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