Indian Special Forces

[mcpo117]

abso-fucking-lutley
A good analysis I agree with everything stated here

thank you. I'm trying my luck on article writing on current affairs. this is my first attempt at it. hope you liked it.

 

[Zoid Raptor]

View attachment 14827View attachment 14828View attachment 14829
Para SF + Garud

Do Para SF undergo strength/weights training or is it just endurance since they look like the average "Kumar" from UP. Some of the smaller guys even look malnourished compared to western or SE Asian SOF.

It seems like only MARCOS take strength training and protein intake seriously

 

[jaijaganath]

The Struggling State of Indian Army’s Para SF: High Casualties and Lackluster Combat Tactics in J&K​

The Indian Army’s Para Special Forces (Para SF), once renowned for their precision, courage, and unmatched tactical expertise, have found themselves in a concerning struggle against militants, particularly in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). Recent encounters have shed light on the high casualty rates, the seeming obliviousness of the military apparatus, and a significant gap in the combat strategies being employed. Despite their elite status, the Para SF's recent performance, especially in counter-insurgency operations, has raised questions about the preparedness, strategy, and effectiveness of India’s military apparatus. The government's approach to these challenges also deserves scrutiny, as the need for reform has never been more urgent.

Recent Struggles and High Casualties​

The Para SF, responsible for executing high-risk operations, is tasked with neutralizing the most dangerous militants entrenched in difficult terrains. However, in recent encounters in J&K, particularly in Kashmir Valley, the Special Forces have faced high casualties that highlight a critical issue: the tactics and equipment being used are not always adequate to cope with the evolving nature of militant warfare.

During operations in areas such as Pulwama and Shopian, Para SF units have encountered heavy resistance, often leading to casualties. One of the most notable encounters was in the late months of 2023, when a Para SF unit suffered significant losses during a botched operation against a group of militants in a densely forested area. The militants, equipped with modern weapons, used guerrilla tactics to outmaneuver the SF soldiers, who, despite their training, were caught off guard by the insurgents' hit-and-run strategy. This incident reflected a larger issue: the changing dynamics of militant warfare in J&K, which seems to outpace the existing counter-insurgency strategies of the army.

The lack of sufficient intelligence, inadequate tactical planning, and the failure to anticipate modern guerrilla tactics have played a significant role in the high casualty figures. Special Forces, known for their precision, have been caught in prolonged firefights where rapid extraction and reinforcements were not effectively coordinated, leading to tragic losses. These events show that despite their elite status, the Para SF are being asked to execute increasingly complex operations without the necessary strategic support or situational awareness.

Obliviousness of the Military Apparatus and Government​

One of the most concerning aspects of the current state of Para SF operations is the perceived obliviousness of both the military apparatus and the government to the evolving challenges faced by these elite forces. The army's reliance on traditional counter-insurgency tactics, while effective in earlier years, seems increasingly ineffective in the face of modern militant tactics, which include advanced weapons, better coordination, and cyber-enabled strategies.

Furthermore, the government’s neglect of the soldiers’ welfare has been an ongoing issue. Despite the high casualty rates among the Para SF, there has been little in terms of tangible policy reform or an increase in support for the forces. While the army has been asked to continuously adapt to emerging threats, the political and military leadership has often been slow to recognize the need for comprehensive changes in both the strategies and the equipment provided to the forces.

In addition, the issue of inter-agency coordination has been a significant factor in the failure to execute well-coordinated operations. Intelligence-sharing between different branches of the military, paramilitary forces, and local law enforcement agencies remains fragmented, leading to inefficiencies in identifying and neutralizing militant threats.

What Should Not Be Done​

To address the issues surrounding the Para SF, it is crucial to avoid certain missteps:

1. Avoid Over-Resourcing Single Approaches: One of the biggest pitfalls would be doubling down on the same tactics and expecting different results. Simply increasing the number of troops in the field or continuing with existing, conventional counter-insurgency tactics will only exacerbate the problem. The insurgents have adapted to these tactics, and the approach needs to evolve.
2. Don’t Overlook Technological Integration: The military should not underestimate the role of modern technology in warfare. The insurgents in J&K are increasingly relying on drones, encrypted communication, and cyber tools. The Indian Army’s Special Forces should not be left behind in this aspect. Lack of investment in technology has cost the lives of soldiers during these operations.
3. Avoid Politicizing Military Decisions: Any attempt to influence military strategies and operations for political gain must be avoided. The decision-making process regarding troop deployment, strategy, and reinforcements should always remain apolitical and driven by military intelligence and strategic goals, not political considerations.

What Should Be Done to Change the Outcome​

There are several actionable steps that the Indian government and military authorities should take to improve the operational efficiency and safety of Para SF units:

1. Enhanced Intelligence Gathering and Analysis: The government must prioritize improved intelligence-gathering mechanisms, especially in real-time. The integration of AI-driven surveillance systems, better satellite imagery, and local informants is vital for tracking militant movements and preempting attacks. This intelligence must be shared seamlessly across all military and paramilitary units involved in the operation.
2. Adopt Flexible, Adaptive Combat Tactics: The Indian Army needs to shift its focus to more flexible combat tactics. Para SF, while elite, should not be expected to tackle conventional combat situations alone. The army should embrace asymmetric warfare strategies, adapting to the guerrilla tactics used by militants. This includes creating smaller, more mobile, and rapidly deployable units to respond quickly to changing conditions on the ground.
3. Technological Upgrades and Training: It is crucial to equip the Special Forces with the latest technologies, including night-vision equipment, drones for surveillance, and advanced communication tools that allow for quicker coordination in difficult terrains. The government should allocate funds to modernize the equipment of soldiers in the field, focusing on both offensive and defensive technologies.
4. Improved Medical and Extraction Protocols: In situations where casualties occur, the speed of medical attention and extraction is paramount. The army must improve its medical response systems, ensuring that paramedics and helicopters are readily available in battle zones. A faster, more efficient extraction system could save the lives of soldiers who would otherwise succumb to injuries in the absence of timely medical care.
5. Better Soldier Welfare and Support: The well-being of soldiers must be prioritized. Adequate compensation, post-operation mental health support, and rehabilitation are critical for morale. A force as elite as the Para SF needs constant motivation, and ensuring the welfare of the soldiers will help retain the best talent in the force.

Conclusion​

The Para SF’s current struggles in J&K are a stark reminder of the challenges that arise when counter-insurgency strategies remain static in an ever-changing warfare environment. High casualties and ineffective tactics can no longer be tolerated, especially when the lives of elite soldiers are at stake. Both the government and military leadership must act decisively, embracing technological advancements, improving intelligence, and adapting combat tactics to meet the evolving nature of insurgency. By fostering a more supportive and agile environment for the forces, the Indian Army can ensure that their elite units remain the formidable force they were always meant to be, capable of succeeding in the complex and perilous operations they face today.

Wonderfully written covering most of the points
Bas kahi pe publish kardo like blogspot and all

 

[mcpo117]

Do Para SF undergo strength/weights training or is it just endurance since they look like the average "Kumar" from UP. Some of the smaller guys even look malnourished compared to western or SE Asian SOF.

It seems like only MARCOS take strength training and protein intake seriously

I believe it has been discussed in the og platform enough. Indian military mostly prefer endurance thats why the lean body. however things are changing slowly. more and more soldiers are being seen with decent build bodies. its India. gonna take a lot of time for a small change to happen.

 

[mcpo117]

Wonderfully written covering most of the points
Bas kahi pe publish kardo like blogspot and all

I have no idea regarding publishing. I'm amateur

 

[RDXChauhan]

Old School MARCOS operating in valley in 2000s

View attachment 14859

Is that a negev? Negev ng7

 

[COLDHEARTED AVIATOR]

abso-fucking-lutley
A good analysis I agree with everything stated here

Except for 8een writing Insta profiles who take everything on their ego here everyone realises that our drills and equipment are not there.

The recent success of mujahideen against Para SF is not because of some magical powder tangos have found in Tora Bora caves it is because they have upgraded their optics.

Its really simple.

Paki Army has some fine snipers on LOC and they have trained these tangos well.

Rest is all surprise..its not a big deal.

What problem we are facing is that we are not evolving as per the era.

Our officers who come on podcasts seem brainwashed into thinking that a Equipment can do no good to them.

I dont understand this not willing to change attitude!

Equipment saves lives and wins your battles!

 

[Jedi Operator]

Is that a negev? Negev ng7

hnji tab service mei ayi hi thi MARCOS ke pass, they were the first ones to use it. Negev was in service after 1997-8 I guess and MARCOS started testing them in 1999, seems like they got them operational around 2000-2001 because that is where this picture is from

 

[COLDHEARTED AVIATOR]

Do Para SF undergo strength/weights training or is it just endurance since they look like the average "Kumar" from UP. Some of the smaller guys even look malnourished compared to western or SE Asian SOF.

It seems like only MARCOS take strength training and protein intake seriously

Para trains for endurance thatswhy they look like a Marathon runner.

They could be well endowed but their diet is shit…simple carbs and white sugar..minimal protein.

 

[mcpo117]

Do give it a read and share. Thanks for support in advance.

The Struggling State of Indian Army’s Para SF: High Casualties and Lackluster Combat Tactics in J&K

The Indian Army’s Para Special Forces (Para SF), once renowned for their precision, courage, and unmatched tactical expertise, have found ...

sentinel08.blogspot.com

 

[Arad Operator]

Is that a negev? Negev ng7

SFF and MCF got it in late 90's AFAIK.

 

[Arad Operator]

R.I.P to the braveheart and condolences to the family!


View: https://x.com/OsintTV/status/1855584675432964314

 

[Alby]

Is that a negev? Negev ng7

Negev in 5.56.NG7 came in the last decade only.

 

[RDXChauhan]

SFF and MCF got it in late 90's AFAIK.

Any images of Negev with SFF?

 

[COLDHEARTED AVIATOR]

Le... & there was a show on ndtv in congi era... where para guys were having rice, sambhar & 2 eggs in lunch.

Egg meat and chicken are there but its not everyday thing.

Personal purchases can be made.

 

[Tier 1 Patriot]

Egg meat and chicken are there but its not everyday thing.

Personal purchases can be made.

Absolutely use SF allowance for personal care

 

[iNorthernerOn9]

Suppose there are 12000 SF troops to feed...

Diet:
1. 2 eggs
2. 2 meat pieces
3. A bowl of sprouts
4. 300ml milk
5. Another milk product... curd, Paneer?

All this will cost approx... INR 135 per day(including procurement & preparation) or less if ordered in bulk.

12000 × 135 × 365 = approx 59.13 crore per annum... kaunsa pahad toot gaya?

 

[COLDHEARTED AVIATOR]

Suppose there are 12000 SF troops to feed...

Diet:
1. 2 eggs
2. 2 meat pieces
3. A bowl of sprouts
4. 300ml milk
5. Another milk product... curd, Paneer?

All this will cost approx... INR 135 per day(including procurement & preparation) or less if ordered in bulk.

12000 × 135 × 365 = approx 59.13 crore per annum... kaunsa pahad toot gaya?

Entire Army will ask then so u multiply by 1.5 million.

 

[iNorthernerOn9]

Entire Army will ask then so u multiply by 1.5 million.

Isn't there already a segregation in ration allotment as per branch & posting? So this special case can be created.

 

[Screambowl]

On every level... from diet to equipment... we are f**ked...

Give them mutton/ mutton soup (not chicken) for endurance and fitness especially the ones serving in high altitude areas. It is very good for lungs. Half of the high altitude and winter problems will vanish. Depending too much on alcohol will create more problem.