Indian Special Forces

Are those some type of AK derived rifles?
Do special forces use them usually?

Chings can easily copy some AR-15 derivatives so why stick to AK derivative?
Its not AK derivative its kind of mix
Action of AK is best but its ergonomics and modularity are shit
In ar modularity and ergonomics are great
So in this chinki rifle which is qbz191
It have action of AK and ergonomics of ar i think we should also have done and adopted something similar i think drdo ugrum is also kind of same concept
 
Yup, those patches have their ranks and respective names, take a close look.

View attachment 14581
Always thought this was very silly- yes low vis ranks are good but to include their own names on them are kind of defeating the point.

One thing NSG has quietly but staunchly rolled out in recent years is using callsign/role identifiers and you’ll struggle to see a SAG (even the more direct action SRGs/SCGs) unit without them these days:

once you see it you can’t unsee it:

View: https://youtube.com/shorts/LGHLCWlKgcA?si=j218xsEspLIGW-HV

View: https://x.com/platypus_10/status/1836795555244302339?s=46


View: https://x.com/kilo_spec/status/1785636816810606907?s=46

This should be mandatory for all Indian specialist units especially those with sensitive mandates as the risk from honeypots/infiltration is just too strong these days. All you need to know is someone’s name and branch and you can find them pretty easily on the web. Then you get the Paras who regularly walk around with their full names and ranks in bright badges but alas…

Have been doing quite a lot of looking into NSG recently and I find it quite interesting to see the disparity in the various units- SAGs, SCGs and SRGs. On the one hand it’s positive to see that SRGs are being trained (and somewhat equipped) up to a CT standard but when you see a NSG unit with bare A1 MP5s and sh!tty gear it’s fair to assume they are SRG:

IMG_0210.webp


As I said there’s a LOT of NSG content out there now (mostly from SRG guys, make of that what you will) but it gives a relatively decent insight into their current level

View: https://youtube.com/shorts/p9kr52O8g_Y?si=juNDufxOQXR37ubg


View: https://youtube.com/shorts/FpQ3guqPp2Y?si=LYg7F4eF2i1-JOlC

https://youtube.com/shorts/Yl63eSj5_ck?si=t8PS_ci_1cV_TfpG

https://youtube.com/shorts/Ng98OyEgC5A?si=eISTRcfXVorb--g_

https://youtube.com/shorts/9_F8l1alIMc?si=3BRXphnokLORWTdM

https://youtube.com/shorts/CYA3XAcyBhY?si=sxjfXruUy1vNGJ9g

still hilariously behind any contemporary unit in the West but at the same time decently uniform and showing decent evolution. That said >90% of the content out there will be from SRGs/SCGs, we won’t see the best stuff (CTFF) very often and maybe that’s for the best.

NSG seems to be evolving into a bit of a FBI tactical team model- local hubs have SWAT teams whilst the CTTF is retained for the top tier threats like HRT. It’s a decent foundation especially with NSG being pulled out of VVIP guarding roles from early 2025- incidentally if NSG are being pulled from this why the fk is this still a role for PARAs? Senior IA brass have bigger egos and smaller pr!cks than even petty netas now?
 
View attachment 15095
View attachment 15096

He's C clamping , sweeeeeeeeeeeeetttt..........
Train as you fight….

Last time Paras took their own (sh!tty) weapons, this time used host provided weapons?

You’ll almost never see Western (or even decent Asian) SOFs participating in these joint exs without their standard loadouts but Indian units will borrow weapons/helmets from hosts and issue brand new specifically provided for the ex equipment. This is not serious warfighter behaviour and makes them look like LARPers
 
Always thought this was very silly- yes low vis ranks are good but to include their own names on them are kind of defeating the point.

One thing NSG has quietly but staunchly rolled out in recent years is using callsign/role identifiers and you’ll struggle to see a SAG (even the more direct action SRGs/SCGs) unit without them these days:

once you see it you can’t unsee it:

View: https://youtube.com/shorts/LGHLCWlKgcA?si=j218xsEspLIGW-HV

View: https://x.com/platypus_10/status/1836795555244302339?s=46


View: https://x.com/kilo_spec/status/1785636816810606907?s=46

This should be mandatory for all Indian specialist units especially those with sensitive mandates as the risk from honeypots/infiltration is just too strong these days. All you need to know is someone’s name and branch and you can find them pretty easily on the web. Then you get the Paras who regularly walk around with their full names and ranks in bright badges but alas…

Have been doing quite a lot of looking into NSG recently and I find it quite interesting to see the disparity in the various units- SAGs, SCGs and SRGs. On the one hand it’s positive to see that SRGs are being trained (and somewhat equipped) up to a CT standard but when you see a NSG unit with bare A1 MP5s and sh!tty gear it’s fair to assume they are SRG:

View attachment 15649


As I said there’s a LOT of NSG content out there now (mostly from SRG guys, make of that what you will) but it gives a relatively decent insight into their current level

View: https://youtube.com/shorts/p9kr52O8g_Y?si=juNDufxOQXR37ubg


View: https://youtube.com/shorts/FpQ3guqPp2Y?si=LYg7F4eF2i1-JOlC


View: https://youtube.com/shorts/Yl63eSj5_ck?si=t8PS_ci_1cV_TfpG


View: https://youtube.com/shorts/Ng98OyEgC5A?si=eISTRcfXVorb--g_


View: https://youtube.com/shorts/9_F8l1alIMc?si=3BRXphnokLORWTdM


View: https://youtube.com/shorts/CYA3XAcyBhY?si=sxjfXruUy1vNGJ9g

still hilariously behind any contemporary unit in the West but at the same time decently uniform and showing decent evolution. That said >90% of the content out there will be from SRGs/SCGs, we won’t see the best stuff (CTFF) very often and maybe that’s for the best.

NSG seems to be evolving into a bit of a FBI tactical team model- local hubs have SWAT teams whilst the CTTF is retained for the top tier threats like HRT. It’s a decent foundation especially with NSG being pulled out of VVIP guarding roles from early 2025- incidentally if NSG are being pulled from this why the fk is this still a role for PARAs? Senior IA brass have bigger egos and smaller pr!cks than even petty netas now?

its some state police cdo unit in first pic not NSG
 
We are wasting money on NSG. Since its inception, the force has rarely seen combat. Instead, we could have used that budget to provide superior facilities to Army SFs.

There's no practicality of NSG in the Indian scenario. Its creation can be justified if it is used extensively in Kashmir instead of RR and Army for CT ops.

Also, create a new Parachute/Airborne/Pathfinder regiment and exclusively convert the present Parachute Reg into SF.
 
We are wasting money on NSG. Since its inception, the force has rarely seen combat. Instead, we could have used that budget to provide superior facilities to Army SFs.

There's no practicality of NSG in the Indian scenario. Its creation can be justified if it is used extensively in Kashmir instead of RR and Army for CT ops.

Also, create a new Parachute/Airborne/Pathfinder regiment and exclusively convert the present Parachute Reg into SF.
they are made for the worst situation and are the last solution when shit happens. Air marshals are actively deployed so you cant say we dont need them. abb haar rooz thodi hijack aur attack hoga .
 
LOL what? You want state police swat to handle a 26/11 type attack? or do you want your Military SFs to take care of internal issues?
My point is not to undermine the importance of handling internal issues or urban terror threats like 26/11 but to question whether the NSG, as it stands, is the most efficient use of resources.

If the NSG has been rarely deployed for combat, wouldn’t it make more sense to direct that budget toward units like the Army SF or state police SWAT? The NSG could either be repurposed for regular CT ops in Kashmir, relieving the Army SF and RR, or its resources could strengthen existing structures.

Given, that our armed forces are loosely modeled on the UK, any exceptional high-intensity terror attack would come under the prerogative of the SAS. My point is if we have a force like NSG, maintained exclusively for domestic CT ops why not use it extensively in the actual CT zone i.e. Kashmir? NSG any day is better trained and equipped than CRPF or RR for such roles. What are they getting trained for then?

Also, restructuring the Parachute Regiment into a dedicated SF unit while creating a separate Airborne/Pathfinder regiment would enhance role clarity and operational efficiency. This isn’t about abandoning urban CT capability but ensuring every resource is used where it's most effective.
 
We are wasting money on NSG. Since its inception, the force has rarely seen combat. Instead, we could have used that budget to provide superior facilities to Army SFs.

There's no practicality of NSG in the Indian scenario. Its creation can be justified if it is used extensively in Kashmir instead of RR and Army for CT ops.

Also, create a new Parachute/Airborne/Pathfinder regiment and exclusively convert the present Parachute Reg into SF.
I’ve heard it all now

India needs more specialists not more generalists

Give the internal CT job to Para SF? Use NSG instead of RR (effectively an infantry role) in JK? I actually laughed out loud to this

NSG are a last line of defence, they should only be used for the worst and most extreme circumstances. Not every two bit COIN/law enforcement job around. I agree NSG should be used more in JK but only for the high level complex ops that fit into their mandate ie hostage rescue- it should’ve been NSG used in EDI not the paras who botched it in just about every way possible

Also just because they don’t fire rounds off doesn’t mean they aren’t working, who do you think provides the strategic overwatch for high level government events in Delhi and around India? NSG are so stretched in their forward deployments that they have cancelled their raising day celebrations 2 times just in the last 5 years.

Paras are struggling to maintain their ‘specialties’ as they run around as super infantry and you think diluting their mandate and strength further with national CT responsibilities is a good idea?

As an aside NSG are funded by MHA, taking their quite modest budget and throwing it at the black hole that is MoD isn’t going to give you the returns you would think.
 
I think m4 is our
But attachments is of usa
Bcoz us army use hk416
No dude. Pretty sure the M4 is american too. The most common weapon in any US Armed Forces unit is still the M4A1 Block 1 (barring probably the top SOF units). And it makes no sense for US to take out our M4s without the standard attachments. Conversely, makes no sense that Americans would give just the attachments for our M4s.
 
My point is not to undermine the importance of handling internal issues or urban terror threats like 26/11 but to question whether the NSG, as it stands, is the most efficient use of resources.

A Simple Wikipedia Search would tell you what NSG is worth:


Worth its weight in Gold.

SRG is a whole different conversation
 
There's no practicality of NSG in the Indian scenario.

29–30 April 1986: About 300 NSG commandos and 700 Border Security Force troops stormed the Golden Temple in Operation Black Thunder I. The Temple was cleared and handed over to Punjab Police on 1 May 1986. 300 Sikh militants were captured, and there were no deaths or injuries for either side.

January 1988: The NSG conducted Op Black Hawk, a heliborne operation in the Mand area of Punjab. In this operation, two terrorists were killed and one 7.62mm rifle was recovered. It was a massive operation, says former NSG Director-General Ved Marwah, though it did not get many spectacular results like in Black Thunder.

12 May 1988: 1,000 NSG commandos (all ranks) surrounded the Golden Temple for yet another assault, in Operation Black Thunder II. Sniper teams armed with Heckler & Koch PSG-1 rifles with night scopes took up positions, including atop a 300-foot water tower. While commandos from the 51 SAG were divided into assault squadrons, the SRG was used to seal off the area around the temple and for tactical support. In the three-day operation between 15 and 18 May 1988, the NSG cleared the temple. 40 terrorists were killed, and 200 surrendered. In the mid-1990s, an NSG battalion was again deployed in Punjab to confront the Sikh rioters. There they began training the Punjab Police in counter-terrorism.

5 September – 15 January 1988: Guarding of high-risk terrorist code-named 'Jack'.

4 August 1989: Operation Mouse Trap in the Tarn Taran district, Punjab, in conjunction with Punjab Police and other security forces. NSG was able to demonstrate that it was possible to achieve area dominance at night if the strategy and tactics were right. Ved Marwah calls this Operation Night Dominance.

10 November 1990: NSG task force flown to Kolkata to rescue hostages of a Thai Airbus by Burmese students.

25–26 January 1991: The NSG was involved in Operation Ani Ben, on CI tasks in Baroda, (Gujarat) where Punjab terrorists were holed up inside a house. Two terrorists were killed and two AK-47s were recovered.

1 July-20 September 1991: NSG employed along with SIT in search and strike missions after the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi.

25 November – 16 December 1992: 150 commandos were deployed at Ayodhya during the Ram Janambhoomi and Babri Masjid crisis.

27 March 1993: 52 SAG mobilised and moved to Adampur for the rescue of hostages of Indian Airlines Flight IC 486.

24–25 April 1993: NSG Commandos stormed a hijacked Indian Airlines Boeing 737 with 141 passengers on board at Amritsar airport during Operation Ashwamedh. Two hijackers, including their leader, Mohammed Yousuf Shah, were killed and one was disarmed before any hostages were harmed.

October 1998: As part of the implementation of the Union Home Ministry's decision to conduct pro-active strikes against militants, commando teams supported by IAF Mi-25/35 helicopter gun-ships began striking at terrorist groups deep inside the mountains and forests of Kashmir. After helicopter reconnaissance was conducted to pinpoint the militants, the commandos – comprising NSG and Rashtriya Rifles personnel – were para-dropped, along with supplies, into the area to hunt the militants. They had to rely on these supplies and their ability to live off the land until replenishment every fortnight or so. These missions are possibly ongoing.

15 July 1999: NSG commandos ended a 30-hour standoff by killing two terrorists and rescuing all 12 hostages unharmed in J&K. The terrorists had attacked a BSF campus near Srinagar, and killed three officers and the wife of another. The 12 hostages were kept locked in a room.

21 August 1999: After interrogating three captured terrorists, the Delhi Police Crime branch confirmed that two more terrorists were hiding in a one-storied house in Rudrapur, Uttar Pradesh. Since the terrorists were considered armed and dangerous (their colleagues were arrested with 100+ pounds of RDX), the Delhi Police sought assistance from the NSG. A 16-man team arrived at the house at 4:45 am. They began their assault at 5:30 am, before first light. The first militant managed to fire at the commandos with a pistol he kept by his bedside, but was killed an instant later. The second terrorist was shot before he had a chance to fire and died 40 minutes later. No NSG personnel were injured.

December 1999: Terrorists hijacked Indian Airlines flight IC814 from Nepal, and landed in Amritsar, Punjab. Within minutes of landing, the Crisis Management Group (CMG), which authorised the use of the NSG, was informed. But the CMG wasted precious hours and by the time the go-ahead was issued, it was too late. On the other hand, the NSG team on alert was elsewhere and no other team was raised during the delay. The hijacked plane took off before the NSG reached Amritsar Airport. The plane landed in Kandahar, Afghanistan where one hostage was killed. Finally, the Indian Government agreed to the terrorists' demands to release three jailed terrorists. The hostages were released and the terrorists escaped to Pakistan.

February 2000: Following the Flight IC 814 fiasco, the Indian Government decided to implement an Air Marshaling programme. At least two NSG operators were to be present on flights over select routes. These operators would be armed with weapons firing lethal, but low-velocity, fragmentation rounds to minimise danger to the passengers and prevent penetration of the aircraft. Another decision taken was to deploy NSG teams permanently at eight sensitive airports around the country, especially those bordering Pakistan and the North East. This decision was to cut short reaction times for the NSG and eliminate the hassles involved in flying the teams to the hijack site. It is not known if this plan has been put into action.

September 2002 – SAG commandos flew to Karnataka to catch sandalwood smuggler and forest brigand Veerappan in the wake of the kidnapping of a former minister of the state cabinet, Nagappa. They pulled out after suggesting that intelligence for the operation was inadequate. A small team was left behind to help, the hostage was eventually killed in December 2002.

October 2002 – Two terrorists attacked the Akshardham temple complex in Gujarat. NSG flew in, delayed by traffic in Delhi. They carried out assaults in which one commando was killed and another one was seriously injured and died after 18 months in a coma. By morning, the terrorists were neutralised and the operation was completed successfully.

December 2002 – Terrorists attacked the Raghunath temple in Jammu. NSG was ready to be flown out but was called back at the last minute.

26 November 2008 Mumbai attacks – Operation Black Tornado and Operation Cyclone to flush out terrorists & rescue hostages after multiple attacks across Mumbai, India. Major Sandeep Unnikrishnan and Havaldar Gajender Singh Bisht of the NSG's 51 Special Action Group were killed in action during the operations. Over 900 rooms were scanned, 8 terrorists killed and over 600 hostages rescued during the operation.

2013 Hyderabad blasts – Deployed in Hyderabad after the bomb blasts.

2013 Bangalore Bomb Blast – NSG was deployed in Bangalore after the bomb blast took place in the city.

2013 Patna bombings – A team of the NSG, which was sent to Patna for post-blasts analysis, said at least three more Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) were defused.

2016 Pathankot attack – An NSG team took part in the operation to neutralise terrorists where Lt. Col. Niranjan lost his life defusing a grenade or IED booby-trapped on the body of a dead terrorist, and 12 other members of the unit were injured. Six terrorists were neutralised in the operation by the NSG, Defence Security Corps and the Garud Commando Force

May 2023 – A team of NSG Commandos was deployed in Srinagar, Jammu & Kashmir along with a team of MARCOS Commandos to provide security to the G20 delegates during the 3rd G20 Tourism Working Group Meeting held at the Sher-i-Kashmir International Convention Centre on the banks of Dal Lake in Srinagar during May 22–24
 

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